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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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NO LEADS DISCOVERED IN PLO OFFICIAL'S MURDER

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Aug 83 pp 1, 3

/Excerpts/ The body of Palestinian fighter Ma'mun Muraysh, who was assassinated on the morning of 20 August, was transported to Amman on 22 August. His widow, Sanadiyah, and their three children, 13-year-old Nakhil, 9-year-old Bassan, and 4-year-old Masa'id, accompanied the body. Masa'id has a bullet lodged in his left leg and was to have been operated on in Athens. In the end it was decided to have the operation performed in Amman.

Moreover, Mr Armali, head of the PLO diplomatic delegation in Athens, again placed the responsibility for the assassination on the Israelis in statements given on 22 August. He added that he had spoken on the telephone to Yasir 'Arafat and that 'Arafat is deeply upset about Ma'mun Muraysh's assassination, the second in the PLO's military hierarchy. Mr Armali also announced that the PLO will provide the Greek police with whatever evidence it has at its disposal, which will aid the inquiry.

The Investigations

Police investigations to find the assassins of the PLO cadre remain fruitless.

In the meantime, suspects, mostly owners of large motorcycles, are being brought before the General Security police and interrogated. So far all have offered alibis. Thus the efforts of the police to find and arrest the assassins remain fruitless.

He Felt Safe

From the testimony of witnesses given so far, and above all that of Mustafa 'Ali, who was wounded during the assassination attack, Muraysh settled in Greece because--as he said--he felt safe here. He had developed a shipping business and had purchased three ships. He had bought the last one recently and on 20 August was on his way to inspect it at Keratsini where it was anchored.

Interpretations

With very little evidence, the General Security police are continuing to inquire into the crime. The fact that the victim was involved in policial activities

abroad makes it very likely that the perpetrators have already escaped, whether they are Israelis, as the PLO cadres maintain, or they are members of the Arab organization, "The Corrective Movement of Fatah," which telephoned the French news agency in Tunisia and the Kuwaiti newspaper AL QABAS, taking responsibility for the assassination.

REUTER

REUTER informed on 22 August from Tunis that, according to a communique from the WAFA news agency, the PLO believes that the Israeli intelligence organization MOSSAD is responsible for the assassination of the Palestinian in Athens.

According to the agency, Muraysh belonged to the Fatah cadre, the main guerrilla Palestinian organization, which is led by PLO head Yasir 'Arafat.

The murdered man was also a close collaborator of Khalil al-Wazir, second-in-command of the PLO armed forces, known as Abou Jihad. On 21 August the Kuwaiti newspaper AL QABAS reported in an article that it had received an anonymous phone call, according to which the "Corrective Movement," within Fatah, is responsible for the assassination.

The news agency WAFA has announced that Mossad is trying to exacerbate the internecine disagreements among the Palestinians.

11587

CSO: 3521/425

GREECE SEEN CENTER FOR ILLEGAL ARMS SHIPMENTS

Athens ETHNOS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 4 Sep 83 pp 10-11

[Excerpts] Lately, arms smuggling is blossoming all over the world. Airplanes, ships and trucks filled with armaments of all kinds are seized every so often in different countries.

It is not possible for Greece to escape from the international smuggling game.

Furthermore, because of its geographic location, the conformation of its land and its thousands of islands, it invites and serves the plans of the organized circles that engage in arms smuggling.

The discovery, even though belated, and seizure of a smuggling pirate plane at Salonika's Mikra airfield, which last week made headlines in Greece, constitutes a recent incident.

On the occasion of this serious incident, we will give our attention to the entire subject of the arms smuggling circuit.

The Transportation

The transportation of arms by smugglers is done:

1. By sea;
2. By land;
3. By air.

It appears from the data of the Security authorities that in Greece the transportation of armaments is carried out, by and large, by sea. The same occurs in other countries that are bordered by seas.

The transportation is easy because the vessels are inspected only perfunctorily at the ports of embarkation.

As a result, weapons go through customs purportedly as farm machinery or other merchandise.

However, a vessel loaded with arms and ammunition does not need to go to a port to be unloaded.

It uses deserted beaches where it anchors at night and is unloaded with ease. This cargo is loaded onto trucks, usually vans, often refrigerated, and taken to its destination.

According to the data of the Security authorities, no ship loaded with weapons has been seized with Greece as its destination.

Whatever ship was discovered after investigation, or by chance, by Port or other Police authorities was simply in transit through here and its cargo was destined for another country.

The coasts and the sea areas in general constitute the easiest locations for arms and ammunition traffic.

The transportation of arms can take place by land as well, however, not with the great ease as that done by sea.

The difficulties are many because strict inspections take place at the points of entry and exit and it is difficult for cargoes of arms to get through.

In Greece, of course, we have not had any incidents that have involved the authorities with cargoes of arms.

Several cargoes have been discovered in other countries. Actually, Customs or other government employees, who had been bribed by the smugglers, were always involved.

By Aircraft

The third way of transporting arms actually covers a small percentage of the never-ending traffic of arms for supplying terrorists or other various movements.

The smugglers themselves say that the transportation by air is often a kind of first aid for whoever is in urgent need of weapons.

Recently an incident of arms transportation by air was the contraband which was discovered on Wednesday, 24 August, at Salonika's Mikra airfield.

Thefts

Terrorists and other groups acquire at least part of their supplies by attacking large government depots and barracks.

This method is ideal because it does not cost them anything.

In Greece we have had thefts of arms from Army and Police units.

A recent episode was the large theft of arms from the Kaisariani pistol range and, specifically, from the area of the Cities Police.

The case was solved and P. Tyrselis and his companions, who had stolen the weapons, were arrested.

In closing, we would like to emphasize that the subject of the movement of arms keeps our Security authorities very busy because our 3,000 islands and our shores "make it easy" for the smugglers.

The minister of Public Order, Mr. Giannis Skoularikis, shows special interest in the subject and has issued strict orders to the responsible services of the Security Corps to be on the alert at all times.

9731

CSO: 3521/442

WEAPONS, GOODS STOLEN FROM ARMY UNIT

Personal Reasons Invoked

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 14 Aug 83 p 1

/Excerpts/ Far-right reserve officer Giorgos Dimou cited economic difficulties stemming from the undesired pregnancy of his girl friend to justify his confessed theft of weapons and ammunition from an army unit at Lamia.

Giorgos Dimou, who was transported in haste by army helicopter from Lamia to Athens, has confessed that at intervals he stole from his unit eight automatic FN 762 rifles manufactured in Belgium, bullets, and many pairs of new army boots, army sleeping bags, fur-lined jackets, and various other goods, which he sold to private citizens at a ridiculous price.

More specifically, he sold the latest model automatic FN rifles for 17,000 drachmas each.

As Deputy Minister of National Defense Andonis Drosogiannis announced on 13 August, the theft was discovered only 1 month ago when an inventory was ordered to take place at the Lamia army unit where the reserve officer was serving. Giorgos Dimou was the responsible administrative officer for the mobilized unit and, thanks to his position, could easily steal weapons. The officers who did the inventory count found that weapons and other military goods were missing and asked about the fate of those weapons. "I stole them," he answered, and that is when the inquiries began.

Dimou's claim, however, was not entirely believed by the security officers who interrogated him because available information suggests that the arrested man is a member of the far right, and it is noteworthy that he is the son of a retired army brigadier general.

Dimou sold two of the eight FN rifles to a retired 1st lieutenant from whom he received 34,000 drachmas. The name of the retired officer has not yet been made public.

According to information from military sources, the retired 1st lieutenant who bought the two weapons is from Kalamata and his name has been linked with terrorist activities involving also far-right participants.

After Army investigations, one FN rifle was found in the house of farmer Kostas Dalakas, 35, from Larymna.

Among those indicated by the reservist as having bought arms is his girl friend's father, Khristos Andoniou, 48, a farmer living in Agnandi. The gendarmery found, in his house, in addition to the FN rifle, an old German pistol, 51 cartridges for a number 303 rifle, and a bayonet.

The reservist had not managed to sell two of the FN rifles and they were found by the gendarmery in his house.

According to information from Lamia, Dimou had frequent contact with right-wing elements in the city.

From the inquiries which have taken place, it has been ascertained that the eight weapons had not been used and that they are in excellent condition.

Buyers Arrested

Athens TA NEA in Greek 13 Aug 83 p 14

/Excerpts/ Lamia, 13 Aug, from our correspondent--Absolute silence and secrecy continue to cover the investigations of Lamia military and police authorities in regard to the theft of weapons from the Lamia army unit.

Late on the evening of 12 August, reliable information reached TA NEA which reports that reservist 2d /sic/ lieutenant Giorgos Dimou, who, as it has been proven, stole weapons and other goods from his unit's storehouse where he was storekeeper, has revealed the individuals to whom he had sold them, and all have been arrested.

As we wrote in yesterday's report, Dimou had stolen eight FN weapons, of which he kept two for himself, which were found in his house in Piraeus. As for the rest, the same source reports that a driver named Giorgos Velios, who lives in Lamia, bought three. As soon as Velios learned that Dimou had been arrested, he rushed to hand over the weapons and affirmed that he had procured them from Dimou in return for a large amount of money.

Another weapon was found in Veroia in the house of Kyriakos Kekivanis, and yet another in the house of Konstandinos Karabas, an Arta resident. Both of them have been arrested.

The last weapon, as we wrote yesterday, was found in the house of farmer Kostas Dalakas in Larymna. He had purchased it through his relative Georgios Dalamaras, who had just been discharged from the army and had served with Dimou.

Dimou's activity, however, was not limited to weapons alone, but he had literally emptied his unit's storehouse. After a search, two large sacks of military goods were found in the house of Evangelos Valatsos, 22, a resident of Styrfaka in Fthiotida, who was Dimou's assistant and had just been discharged from the army.

In the meantime, Dimou's would-be father-in-law, Khristos Andoniou, in whose house, as is known, a pistol was found which had no connection with the stolen weapons, suddenly grew ill and was taken to the Lamia hospital.

According to information from Andoniou family circles, Dimou's claims that supposedly his fiancée had given him away are characterized as false. On the contrary, he himself, in order to revenge himself on her when she left him, led the police to Andoniou's house saying that he had handed over the weapons to his former father-in-law.

Since 12 August the investigations have focused on ascertaining how Dimou succeeded in getting the weapons and other goods away from the unit and if, beyond the purely economic reasons which he is invoking, he was acting on the orders of an extremist political organization.

11587

CSO: 3521/425

TRADE WITH, DEBTS OF CEMA COUNTRIES NOTED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 26 Aug 83 p 9

[Article by Alexander Fieber: "Sales Dearly Paid For"]

[Text] "If we would wrap all the goods in money, we could sell just about anything," is the way one banker characterizes the present trading pattern with the heavily indebted CEMA countries. And he is right because although exports to the East Bloc are stagnating the communist countries' mountainous debts to Austrian banks keep rising. For business reasons, the banker asked not to be quoted by name. But Jan Stankovsky of the Economic Research Institute (Wifi) was not as reticent in agreeing with the banker. "In order to achieve a relatively mild gain in exports to the CEMA countries," he said, "Austria had to come up with a great many more loans."

Just how dearly the Austrian economy and the Austrian banks are paying for and/or prefinancing sales to the East Bloc cannot be gleaned from official statistics, experts say. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the CEMA net debt to Austrian banks amounts to just under \$5.1 billion (the status of credits minus assets with the banks as of late March 1983). But insiders say that the debt in reality amounts to a little over \$ 7 billion (which includes both supplier and other credits).

Over the past few months, control bank director Paul Castellez has recorded no change in state-guaranteed credits to CEMA. But when asked how much the government control bank is liable for, Castellez, who is far from tight-lipped on other occasions, says: "That is a \$64,000.00 question."

Even Wifi, which pointed out the following worrisome trend last year, does not know. To export goods worth one million to the East Bloc, Wifi found, Austria had to grant credits worth $2\frac{1}{2}$ million Schillings in 1981. Western industrial nations spent only 1.2 million Schillings for every one million worth of exports and the FRG only spent about 700,000 Schillings.

Following this "indiscretion" by the economic researchers, the National Bank has "gone off the air" from time to time whenever the question of East Bloc trade figures came up—at least with regard to the banking institutions. In the meantime, however, the CEMA countries' debts to Austrian banks may not have risen dramatically but they have risen. From September 1982 to

March 1983, they increased by about \$ 175 million to \$5.1 billion (according to official statistics). Since exports to these countries did not increase at the same rate during this time period, the experts believe that Austria paid even more dearly than heretofore for the exports to this trading area--in the shape of credits. Stankovsky says this possibility cannot be excluded but adds that there is not enough current or complete statistical material available.

Nonetheless, Austrian bankers feel there is no reason to worry. They point out that Brazil and Mexico owe \$90 billion and \$80 billion respectively--far more than the entire CEMA region whose total debt amounts to \$73.5 billion. "Speaking dispassionately, I would have to say that CEMA is the lesser evil," Castellez states.

Another argument put forward for the less dangerous situation of the CEMA countries is that they are building down their net debt vis-a-vis the "rest of the world." Between 1981 and 1982, the debt declined from \$77.1 to \$73.5 billion. Ilse Grosser of the Vienna Institute of Comparative International Economics, writing in the CA-QUARTERLY (No III/1983), paints a somewhat rosier picture when she says: "For the first time since the late sixties, the CEMA countries succeeded in 1982 in achieving a hard currency trade surplus and in more or less balancing their current account."

"On the other hand," says Stankovsky, "one must look at the problems of the individual CEMA countries separately and take into consideration that their debt to other countries may have declined but that their indebtedness to us has risen slightly." Though the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR and Hungary have a reputation for reliability in paying their debts, Poland and Romania certainly do not.

According to BIS at least, the debt of Poland, wracked by disturbances, martial law and strikes, to Austrian banks has remained virtually constant at about \$1.8 billion since the fall of 1982. But at this time, Friedrich Hartig, the head of the office for foreign trade transactions, does not give really bad marks to Poland. "Our trading partners are complying with all the arrangements," he says. "Over the past 12 months, we have not had a single complaint from any of our member firms that any letters of credit were not paid."

First Ordered and Then Not Paid For

Some Austrian firms have fewer kind words to say for Romanian enterprises. The reason for it is that the Romanians placed goods on order and then wanted to have nothing to do with the letters of credit any more. This has left a number of Austrian firms holding the bag to the tune of more than \$4 million in goods produced on special order. Insiders therefore offer this piece of advice: limit deliveries to goods worth no more than \$10,000

to \$20,000 and do not continue transaction until the letter of credit has been cashed. But Hartig has noted a new trend toward reliability on the Romanians' part. Romania's net indebtedness to Austrian banks amounts to just about \$160 million. "That is not all that much—but only if they pay it back," one banker has said. The same applies to a sober look at the Polish credits because they are not fully guaranteed by the control bank.

Insiders say that the banks are solely responsible for some \$350 million in debts which the government has not guaranteed. But which bank has to worry about how much of the Polish debt is a well-kept secret. "If the Russians do not take too much of the goods away from them which they could sell for dollars, we might regain confidence in the Polish economy once more," Hartig says.

In terms of overall outstanding debts due Austrian banks, the GDR which holds second place in the parade of debtors with more than \$1 billion would seem to pose a problem, too. But the experts say that productivity in the GDR is greater than in some of the other CEMA countries. "They are also producing goods that are easier to sell," says Hartig who has noted an increase in barter transactions.

CEMA Net Indebtedness to Austrian Banks as of Late March 1983

(in Millions of \$)

Bulgaria	135.2
CSSR	440.0
GDR	1,079.0
Hungary	862.0
Poland	1,819.0
Romania	163.0
USSR	581.0

9478

CSO: 3620/6

POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON EXPORTS OF ELECTRICITY RATES RISE

Nicosia 0 AGON in Greek 5 Sep 83 p 1

[Excerpts] It is considered certain that the price of electricity will be increased in a short period of time, but a final decision will be made by the Council of Ministers when the suggestion is presented to it by the minister of commerce and industry. The new increase will be more of a burden to consumers than to industry.

The increase in electricity rates was considered necessary in order to enable the Electricity Authority to fulfill the commitments it made to the International Bank after concluding a loan for expansion of its facilities; this can only happen with an increase in its income.

The government informed the trade and industrial world about its decision at a conference which took place several days ago, since industrial electricity will also be influenced by the increase.

Employers' Reactions

Employers were opposed to the government's intention and, according to our information, will seek a meeting with the president of the republic and ask him for the price of electricity not to be increased since there will be great repercussions on industry at a time when a recovery in the economy is being seen.

Competitiveness

Tradesmen are sure that the price hike will decrease even more the competitiveness of our products on foreign markets and, at the same time, will increase the price index; thus the cost of local products will rise.

The only solution for avoiding repercussions on industry is for the government to assume the financial burden.

9247

CSO: 3521/448

BRIEFS

CENTS REPLACE MILS--The new cent coins have been given to the banks, they will be circulated among the public on 3 October. Three years after the ministerial decision for simplification of Cyprus' monetary system, introduction of the cent is beginning, while the coins in circulation are to be withdrawn finally by the end of 1986. As was reported to yesterday's press conference by Mr. Theodoridis, business director at the Central Bank, they were informed, and began receiving 17 million cent coins. As he said later, the mil coins will be returned and will be replaced with cent coins. From this replacement, the Central Bank will draw a profit of 170,000 pounds a year derived from the difference in the value of producing the coins because the currency for 250 mils, for example, costs 38 mils, while the coins for 20 cents (200 mils) costs only 11 mils. Particular reference was made to the method of converting mils to cents and it was stressed that this is very simple. From the total mils, we deduct a zero and we have cents. For example, as reported, 500 mils corresponds to 50 cents. One zero is deducted. [Excerpt] [Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 2 Sep 83 p 1] 9247

CSO: 3521/448

CCOO'S CAMACHO ON RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT, UGT POLICY

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 9-15 Sep 83 p 23

[Interview with CC.OO. Secretary Marcelino Camacho by I.G.; date and place not specified]

[Text] "Nicolas Redondo, secretary general of UGT, called August an ill-fated month for the union movement, referring to the measures approved by the government. We asked Marcelino Camacho, secretary of CC.OO., if he agrees with Redondo's statements."

[Answer] I agree with Redondo in so far as August was the month in which a series of ill-fated attempts was made by men close to the government. In August the generalization of temporary hiring came into the arena, when the experience of other countries, like France, shows that temporary hiring does not create employment, but brings down wages and eliminates professional positions. There was also talk in August of a Social Security reform which partially assumes its restriction, the setting up of pension funds and a 20 to 30 percent reduction in future pensions, as well as a 6-percent wage increase for next year, that is, an increase 2 percent lower than the previously announced 8-percent increase. Regarding the 4-year plan, it has been said that it will not be a joint or common plan, that its life will be reduced to 3 years and that there will be no sort of agreement. This was August in a nutshell.

[Question] UGT delayed in reacting, but with unexpected forcefulness for the sister organization of the party in power.

[Answer] We wish to tell Nicolas Redondo that Miguel Boyer announced in May flexibility and liberal lay-offs for some workers' collectives. The other negative measures we have referred to were also previously expounded by the government. To them must be added the plans for industrial reconversion, and putting public enterprises on a sound footing, administrative reform, agricultural reform and budget reforms; that is, the announced measures are not new."

[Question] How do you evaluate the new attitude of socialist headquarters?

[Answer] I think UGT did right to change. Previously, we in CC.OO. would be accused of making a policy of confrontation with the government, but now Redondo up and says they have no choice either but to oppose the situation. We value UGT's position, but we ask it to take one step further and put forward together with us the demand for the government to carry out its program, for it to take measures to create the 800,000 jobs that will never be created under its present policy; that is, for it to change economic policy, and in addition, for it to change the ministerial economic team. A large measure of the credibility of UGT's criticisms is linked to the way it decides to work from now on.

[Question] In the petition for the resignation of those responsible ministerially and economically it appears that CC.OO. will not be alone, for the criticisms of UGT, too, point at Miguel Boyer and Joaquín Almunia.

[Answer] I made that request on other occasions, that is, for a change in economic policy, and in the economic team besides. Weathering the crisis is still a human, class and national need, but weathering it will only be possible if there are deep changes which by giving new rights to workers, will allow freeing the creative forces in the firms. The people elected a government for change with more than 10 million votes and for 4 years, with a de facto power heading it which opposes real changes. The people are desirous of change, but the government is not; a fundamental sector of the government yields in the economic and international sphere to the real powers. We agree with the government when it says it is necessary to reduce unemployment and create 800,000 jobs, but the policy it applies does not lead to that. We agree when they speak of reducing inflation and the deficit in the balance of trade, but we disagree with the hard means of adjustment they propose to achieve it.

[Question] How does the CC.OO. intend to confront relations with the government and what does it intend to do in the coming months?

[Answer] The government does not go for the desire for change expressed in the general elections, but we are not condemned to see how the economic and social policy arising from the PSOE's program is degenerating, since it had many limitations and therefore we consider it to be insufficient to end the crisis. With our effort we can drive those forces toward real changes in economic policy and can do the same in the international sphere, which is another of the most negative elements in leading us to a rearmament policy and keeping in NATO. CC.OO. is going to propose going to a series of demonstrations in the main urban centers in Spain in order to achieve real negotiation of a joint or common plan involving reindustrialization, complete land reform, control of the financial system, common or joint fund, reduction of the working day, planned retirement, etc. We will probably call together the mobilizations this very September.

[Question] Are you going to invite UGT to join in these mobilizations?

[Answer] Of course we are. We wish to create the socio-political desire for change and we are going to create it by mobilizing and uniting the workers. We tell the UGT: according to the criticism you make, but you have to try

a different approach when making demands of the government. If they do not do it, we are going to think that there is something behind it, and that what they are trying to do is avoid wear and tear by joining the government's economic policy, but if such is not the case, they will have to agree with us. UGT has a great responsibility in this regard, because it has endorsed and backed that policy and even opposed negotiating economic and labor problems, arguing that they were the exclusive responsibility of the government. Now they have seen that such is not the case and that the workers must be watchful.

12440

CSO: 3548/505

ND PREPARES NEW POLITICAL PROGRAM

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18-19 Sep 83 pp 1,3

[Article by Andreas Zoulas]

[Text] The completion of New Democracy's new government program, which is being drawn up by a special party committee and is expected to be ready in a first final text around the end of September to beginning of October, is considered an important political event. ND factors stress that the political significance of the "new government program" is many-sided: First, because it is a "new proposal" for the administration and political conduct of the government, a proposal which is at the antipode of PASOK from the standpoint of both political expression and specific measures. Second, because it is a definite crystallization of the political physiognomy of ND as a party which consciously believes in and serves the democratic principle of the mid-course in the whole spectrum of government policy. Third, because it is an "overall position" of the official opposition which, as long as it is subject to this, creates the condition for a bipartisan dialogue and confrontation of the real problems faced by Greek society.

The same factors, referring to ND's "new government program"--which will be ready in a final phase next December, following a wider inner-party discussion--stress that its basic aim is: to be the principal means of coalescing around ND that sector of the electoral body which logically expects that the party will vote for implementation of a realistic program which will contain the indispensable elements and conditions for effectiveness.

With the criterion that one of the principal demands in the coming elections--perhaps the most principal--will be precisely the effectiveness of government policy, the "new government program" makes a most important choice: securing a wider acquiescence for taking measures on major issues. Thus, with this program, beyond the general directions laid--which also portend the form of the specialized measures which will be announced only during the pre-electoral period--steps are introduced which aim at securing the greatest possible political and social acquiescence during the procedure of planning and taking every important measure.

This critical choice is based on the estimation that the ineffectiveness of PASOK's policy is owing to a great degree to the fact that, because of the government's constant retrogressions, and because of the radical overturning of institutions and structures attempted by the government, the conviction is growing stronger and

stronger that every government measure will be either revoked or amended by the government or will be overturned by its successor. One result of this practice is that the social whole cannot believe that any stable framework is being formed within which its activity would develop over a medium length of time, which, in any case, will be greater than each government's typical term of service.

In addition, the same choice echoes ND's conviction--which has been repeatedly expressed by its president and leading cadres--that its work as an eventual successor of PASOK in power will be most difficult, and for reasons which are related to the opposition which an ND government would face on the part of representatives of social and professional agencies which would be politically opposed to it.

No Bipartisan Responsibility

On the basis of this reasoning, ND's "new government program" gives particular emphasis to the issue of political and social acquiescence. Thus, the official opposition party proclaims as its fundamental governmental obligation taking measures which will aim at securing a very wide acquiescence, but without these measures reaching the point of establishing a "bipartisan political responsibility." The political responsibility for charting government policy and taking measures continues to remain in the government. Reported as an example of a practical application of such a principle is the settling of issues vitally important for socio-economic life by exploiting the existing system of codes. It is maintained that the existing system--legislative authorization for formation of a special committee to work out a code which systematically and spherically will deal with some great issue (for example, the issue of public administration)--can be enriched with elements which will ensure both a minimum program jointly accepted by the greatest possible spectrum of the political world and the approval of the interested parties.

The related chapter of ND's program, which refers to the issue of political and social acquiescence, includes two most important segments of the country's political life: the parliament and the press. Here also, the corresponding general directions arise from a differentiation from the way PASOK has exercised governmental power up to now. The need to upgrade the role and operation of the parliament is perceived, and the government's responsibility to take measures which will aim at securing a vocal chorus in the press is proclaimed.

The whole "new government program" is governed by the basic ideological principles of ND, with a central value being freedom of action. The general directions, which are charted in partial chapters, confirm and serve these ideological principles. Thus, the chapter entitled "Ideologically" is the general framework within which is sketched ND's political physiognomy, but also the type of socioeconomic life which it will aspire to develop with its policy.

The ideological principles are specialized and applied in "basic sectors" (economy, education, health and welfare, environment, housing, etc.), as well as in "circumstances and conditions of life" by categories of citizens (workers, pensioners, housewives, farmers, businessmen, youths, etc.).

In the economic sector, a basic principle ruling the ND "new government program" is the liberation of Greek society's creative forces, on the basis of personal

initiative. A bold simplification of procedures to facilitate business activity is announced. It is indicatively reported that in this sector it is proposed that the "permits" be abolished which it is necessary for one single person to collect for a specific activity. The only permits to be kept are those referring to the health and safety of workers and citizens and for environmental protection.

Freedom in financing for business activity is also suggested.

Government Intervention Restricted

In addition, the limits on public activity and government intervention are clearly defined. The state's role is primarily confined to intervening in order to ensure equal conditions of competition. The public's economic activity is limited. Restriction of the economy's public sector is expressed not only with the principle of its being extended no further, but also with the replacement of the public by other types of agencies in certain sectors.

Establishment of a truly "open economy" is also pursued, the goal being to exploit and maximize the benefits from such a policy (creation of conditions for competition, promotion of the country as an economic, insurance and maritime center of the eastern Mediterranean).

An analogous liberalistic spirit, applied to modern social needs in accordance with the primary party choice of radical liberalism, governs the basic guiding lines of the whole government policy proposed by ND for the remaining basic sectors also. Reported as an example are:

1. Establishment of the free practice of the medical profession and related professions, with a parallel creation of work conditions in medical institutions which will contribute decisively to raising the level of health care provided.
2. The long-term confrontation of ekistic and city-planning problems, with a goal of developing organized building programs.

9247

CSO: 3521/450

KNE VOICES CRITICISM OF PASOK POLICIES

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 19 Aug 83 p 6

[Excerpts] A sharp criticism and rejection of the PASOK government's policy up to now, a finding that the youth movement is being systematically pushed into an attitude of resignation and compromise but has the potential to continue its militant course, and furthermore a proposal for the development and unified action of mass organizations and separate youth movements having the aim of genuine change, are some features of the positions taken by the Central Council of the Greek Communist Youth [KNE] with respect to its Third Congress (which will take place in December).

These "positions" were made public yesterday by the secretary of the KNE, Spyros Khalvatzis.

In aligning in all instances the positions of the KNE with the decisions of the Eleventh Congress of the KNE, the secretary of the communist youth said the following:

He charged that the PASOK government is following a policy aimed at "coming to terms with the Americans and the monopolies, is proceeding along a road of compromising with imperialism, and is coming into open confrontation with the workers." Even the "minor changes," said Khalvatzis, are becoming efforts to minimize change, and the government is trying to find solutions through a mere tidying up of the truly miserable situation which the Right has left behind. But in this way "the government's policy is being led to impasses in all sectors--something which the ruling class is exploiting to sow disillusion and compromise."

He charged in particular that the Sub-ministry for the Young Generation and Athletics was not promoting certain solutions to problems of young people, and that its chief aim up to now has been an ideological policy of intervention, above all by way of cultural activities, in order to ensure the acquiescence of young people in the government's policy.

He criticized extremely sharply certain governmental actions such as the initialing of the agreement on the bases, its policy vis-a-vis the EEC, and Article 4 of the law on socializations, and he charged that the government is going back on fundamental pre-election proclamations by PASOK, in the name of what is now "feasible."

The Consequences of the Crisis

He stressed that young people in Greece today are suffering serious effects from the crisis of the capitalistic system, the primary one being the increased unemployment, but there are also problems in the educational system, in cultural life, the family, relations between the two sexes, life-style, military service, and so forth. Problems which have consequences extending as far as suicides. And on top of all this, Khalvatzis characterized the aim of the ruling class as that of leading young people to compromise, of holding up to them as a model of life one of solitude, narcotics, and violence, and of shaping them into young people without passion, isolated on the sidelines. But also he expressed the optimistic hope that the Greek youth can resist these things "in such a way that the negative experiences from the governing by PASOK will not be expressed in regression or even in conservative orientations."

He announced that the KNE is proposing to all young people a program of fighting for genuine change. And this is to be in two forms of unified action: 1) Continuation of cooperation with other progressive youth organizations on those issues where there is agreement (above all with the PASOK youth, although he charged that its leadership wants young people to be merely applauders of what the government does, while as for the "Rigas Feraios" organization, he said that it is pursuing a policy of opportunism and that of a "follower," and he said that ONNED [Youth Organization of the New Democracy] is being deceptive with its liberal pretences while expressing the reactionary sector and embracing fascist elements). 2) Cooperation and concerted action among various militant assemblages and movements which are being formed to deal with various national, political, socioeconomic, and other problems, with the objective being to create a broad current of opinion which will further radicalize the youth. The KNE sees this current as made up of various movements and individuals which regardless of their political and ideological positions have the common aim of supporting peace, national independence, and anti-imperialistic solidarity, and in this year especially of supporting the struggle against the stationing of American missiles in Europe and the fight against the signing of the agreement on the bases.

12114

CSO: 3521/430

FORMER PASOK OFFICIALS SPEAK OUT AGAINST PARTY

Athens AKROPOLIS TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 4 Sep 83 pp 5, 15

[Excerpts] Precisely today is the 9th anniversary of the declaration of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (3 September 1974), when the present premier, Andreas Papandreou, founded PASOK and called on the people to join the ranks of the new party by promising in its statutes the "universal demand" of the times: free democratic expression at the grassroots in order to bind the leadership to the political decisions and in order to provide continuity and adherence to its promises (page 14) to achieve the four fundamental goals of the movement:

National independence;

Popular sovereignty;

Social liberation;

Democratic process.

However, to what degree the people share the power and how much PASOK has in general responded to its preelectoral promises, especially to the "democratic" process of the operation of the party, is going to be responsibly told by five of its own cadres (two former ministers and three deputies) who, forced by the fickle politics and the totalitarian methods of PASOK, were compelled, quite soon, to change course by aligning themselves with other parties or to remain independent in the Chamber of Deputies.

Panagoulis

Deputy and former deputy minister of the Interior, Mr. Stathis Panagoulis, in a statement sent to us yesterday for today's "anniversary" emphasizes: "Today, 9 years after the founding of PASOK and 2 years after the victory of the forces of Change and the assumption of the country's administration by the one-party government of PASOK, the people remain spectators of the unacceptable event of the disintegration of everything. It is with a bitter taste of disappointment and bitterness in its soul because decades of struggles have been sacrificed on the altar of the service of anti-popular interests and to the creation of 'illuminated zeroes,' who manage, with the people 'in absentia,' the interests of the country's workers and of the nation.

"Today, a year after my resignation from the office of deputy minister of the Interior--on 27 August 1982--we find ourselves before the unpleasant situation--for the workers and the people--when, all the reasons that led me to resign and split with the policy followed by the premier and the PASOK government, have been solemnly confirmed."

Mechanisms

"I thought that my resignation and the positions I explained in my letter to Mr. Papandreou would have contributed to stopping the downward slide so that we would not have reached the present situation.

"Beyond the sensational failure of the PASOK government in all the large national, political, social and economic problems which confirm our positions--Mr. Panagoulis continued--on the authoritarian-anti-democratic structure and operation of the government and the party organization of PASOK as well as on the activities of the shady dealings for the political and moral eradication of honest militants and cadres who disagree with the tactics of the subservient leadership group.

"A recent example is the anti-democratic expulsion of six old cadres of the Organizing Committee and one member of the Central Committee because they disagreed with the policy of the government cadres and the anti-democratic operation of the party organization."

Impasse

"The present political situation and the tragic impasses that threaten the country demand the taking of initiatives on behalf of the ever-broader coalition of the popular-democratic forces in the struggle to ensure a viable democratic solution. We believe that, above and beyond the one-party rule and the 'stability' of governments, our people are interested first and foremost in the stability of democracy.

"For the above-mentioned reasons, we believe in the initiative of the 'Socialist Associations' for the militant concentration of the popular-democratic forces in all of Greece for the purpose of creating a new political movement."

The Bases

In referring to the foreign-defense policy, Stathis Panagoulis continued by pointing out the inconsistency of the government regarding the opening of the Cyprus file and its retreat on the EEC matter and expressed his opposition to the signing of the agreement for the continuation of the American bases in our country.

He dwelled on a series of problems: income policy, ATA [Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment], unemployment, devaluation of the currency, merchant marine, one-sided austerity, slump in investments and growth of the balance of payments deficit. He emphasized his opposition to the attempt to muzzle the labor movement--Article 4--by appointed administrations; he declared himself for the

National Health Plan, but criticized the government for its intention to unify, by authoritarian methods, the health branches of the pension funds.

Mbotsaris

Dimos Mbotsaris (former mayor of Spata and deputy for Attiki) believes that the "famous" declaration of 3 September became the "sacred" text which, to a great degree, trapped the Greek people.

Mr. Mbotsaris adds: "Sometime ago, Andreas Papandreou, in a moment of candor, told the parliamentary group: 'The proclamation of 3 September surely constitutes our political identity which we must show the people. It is a matter of our good credentials. If, however, we enclose the activities, initiatives and the decisions of PASOK within the confining walls of this faultless socialist text, then we will run the risk of becoming captives ourselves and prisoners of our forward march. The problems will thus become unsolvable and PASOK will be threatened by deadly dangers!'"

Like a Vision...

Incisive words which do not leave any margin for misunderstanding. The platform of the famous declaration has four planks. Four exciting points of reference which make a golden bed on which the 'non-privileged Greek' as well as the 'privileged' can sleep and dream their sweet dreams and ambitious hopes. Only as a vision, naturally and never as a fact, unfortunately.

"The first point of reference in the sacred declaration of 3 September is National Independence, American imperialism, the betrayal of Cyprus, NATO, EEC, 'the bonds of dependence and foreign occupation,' which our powerful allies by various means bring to our country, are the main target here.

"From this source, the great expectation of national pride lit a fire in thousands of souls. The brainwashing slogans jumped out: 'EEC and NATO, the same syndicate,' 'Americans out now!', 'Expel the bases of death' and this amazing composition then ended with the famous: 'Greece belongs to the Greeks.' All of this... was proven with the initialing of the agreement for keeping the American bases and with our continued participation in NATO and the EEC."

Social Register...

"The second reference point of the declaration is the Popular Sovereignty. The entire philosophy of this goal is expressed in the famous slogan: 'PASOK in the government, the people in power.' Of course, the popular sovereignty in order to be implemented presupposes national independence, but this unity was perhaps confiscated in the baggage of Andreas as a hazardous product at some American customhouse.

"The Social Liberation is the third reference point of the 'sacred text.' This is now seen in action by the people in the purposes of the comrades (the green guards) in the... free and independent labor movement (with the appointed administrations of all the labor organizations). It admires it and enjoys it

in the legislative bills of Mr. Koutsogiorgas, in the discontinued wearing of the blue pinafore by female students which would have surely been a useful law had it allowed them to enter the highest educational institutions without entrance examinations as we had promised. It takes pride in it, in the luxury and the tremendous aristocratization of the 'social register of Change,' which dressed in very expensive evening gowns and priceless jewels, worries and agonizes about securing social invitations to the great salons (which, alas, are all hosted by individuals of great monopolistic wealth and multinational capital. Individuals, surely... of doubtful socialism)."

"Democracy"

"The fourth and last plank of the 'green constitution' is the Democratic Process. This is expressed within PASOK in a very persuasive and incontestable way, as in the case of Deputies Giannis Zafeiropoulos, Angelos Perdikos, Vasilis Papadopoulos and myself, who were barred from PASOK's lists of 1981 by the 'democratic process of some stool pigeon,' who whispered in Andreas' ear that we had allegedly formed a group within the movement, without being afforded even the slightest opportunity to defend ourselves for this 'crime' of ours.

"This happened also in the cases known to the people of Deputies Panagoulis, Dimitris Khondrokoukis, Giorgos Petsos, Aris Mbouloukos and many other less known cadres of PASOK, who number more than 150 and were unjustly 'beheaded by the guillotine' of the... democratic process of PASOK which was made by a... simple phone call by Andreas or by Gennimatas or Tsokhatzopoulos or by Laliotis to the president of the disciplinary council with the standard sentence: 'Announce his expulsion to the press!' Also to be observed in the case of the 'democratic process' of the 'living execution' of Andreas Khristodoulidis...

"Besides, it was with the declaration of 3 September 1974 and the 'Open Program of the Governmental Policy of PASOK' that, a few months before the elections of 1981, it was presented to the Greek people and propped up ideologically the Greek socialism of Andreas which has, however, 'an American motor!' A bitter lesson for all of us who were both deceived and betrayed."

Khondrokoukis

Mr. Dim. Khondrokoukis, deputy from Pireaus--who after leaving PASOK belongs to the Liberal Party--has this to say about the "accursed" anniversary of the movement's founding:

"The declaration of the basic principles and goals of 3 September 1974, the Covenant of Honor People-PASOK as well as the PASOK statute have become hollow words. Andreas and his small clique in the Executive Office are appointed by himself and not according to Articles 65 and 67 of the statute. But even the other highest PASOK organ, the CC [Central Committee], is the same because the process of Articles 61 and 62 of the statute was not observed. Here it is worthwhile for me to mention how and when these organs were elected and whether they operate properly at present as demanded by these two texts of its operation, namely: the 3 September 1974 declaration, the PASOK statute and the Covenant of Honor with the People, texts that PASOK proclaims as its Gospels."

The Election

"In the summer of '77, when the movement assembly was convened to elect the CC, Andreas, surrounded by the 'faithful' (Tsokhatzopoulos, Giennimatas, Laliotis) and a few other 'yes-men,' circulated among all the assemblymen-electors (about 800), a note in which Andreas had written: 'It is the desire and wish of the president that, of the 60 seats, the following 40 must be elected without fail...' (the 40 were listed!!). One of the candidates for the CC complained that, thus in fact, the election 'was confined to the 20' and therefore the 'note of Andreas' wishes' should not be circulated. Who listened to him though? He was a voice crying in the wilderness..."

"Thus the election was confined only to the 20 because all the others were 'elected' according to Andreas' wishes. After this 'election' there was a second one for the members of the Executive Office. Here again the names were given to the already elected members of the CC who, according to Article 65 of the statute, elect the members of the Executive Office."

"Thus, in effect, Andreas appointed the two highest organs of the movement since '77, while he should have renewed them with a new assembly of the Party, at least within 2 years (Article 58). I quote: 'Article 58: The Assembly is convened every 2 years. The convening of the assembly can be postponed by decision of the CC for a period not to exceed 1 year.'"

"Andreas and his clique are, therefore, its jugglers in view of the fact that the new assembly after '77 should have been convened in 1979 at the latest. And at the most, he could have postponed it until the end of 1980. This is 1983 already and its convening is unsure, despite what is being touted for 1984..."

"In general, the collective highest organs of PASOK are organs which have been set up by Andreas himself and his group of party faithfuls to legalize with a democratic superficiality their absolutist decisions."

"I should say something as to how the 20 deputies, who complement the 60 of the CC, are elected:

"Article 62 states: 'a.) The 40 members of the CC are elected freely by the Assembly. The members can have any position in the Movement; b.) Twenty members of the CC are elected by the Assembly from among the members of the Parliamentary Group. If the Parliamentary Group has less than 21 members, all its members become part of the CC; c.) Twenty members of the CC are elected by the Assembly from among the members of the branch organizations of the Movement.' The election procedure by the Assembly was not observed for the deputies, as ordered by this article; instead, the method of the 'wish of the President' through the CC was used and not that by the Assembly."

"This, for the 1977-81 Parliament, because for the present Parliament there was no election, even if it were by the CC appointed in 1977. Here, I must point out a tremendous inconsistency of PASOK with regard to statutes and popular will: each of the deputies already has the seal of the will of the people--until now, they have been elected by 'crosses of preference' and not by appointment--with

the number of crosses indicating the will of the people. Then along comes the CC and does not take the people into consideration and elects whomever it pleases. Consequently, one can observe the phenomenon of the last deputy of a District being elected instead of the first, the second, etc. It happened to me and to Kasimatis in Pireaus. I had three times as many crosses as he did, but he was elected to the CC in spite of the popular preference. This is one of the many incidents that show how hypocritical they are when they talk about the will of the people. In the case of the election of the 20 deputies as well, the same thing prevailed as in the other cases of the 'wish of the President.'"

The Declaration

"The declaration of principles of 3 September 1974 promises as goals, in order of importance: National Independence, Popular Sovereignty, Social Liberation, Democratic Process. Let us see, one by one, whether they have been kept:

"National Independence: The encyclical states: '... the roots of the disaster are to be found in the dependence of the homeland on the imperialist complex of the USA and NATO. Greece has been converted into an advanced nuclear outpost of the Pentagon in order to serve more effectively the military and economic interests of the great monopolies. The state institution, the Armed Forces, the political parties, the trade unions, the political leadership of the country have been eroded in such a way as to make possible the imposition of a foreign-controlled dictatorship when this was deemed convenient by Washington...'

"The celebrated declaration of 3 September 1974 claims even more emphatically: 'The tragedy of Cyprus as well as the perils to the nation that have resulted as much from the determined expansionist policy of the Pentagon in the context of NATO as by the effort of the American-controlled Junta to convert our Armed Forces exclusively into a police organ of the Greek nation, is uppermost in the thoughts of every Greek.'

"Our homeland has become an unfenced vineyard for the erosion of our economy by the multinational businesses of the USA and the West, always with the cooperation of the local agents of capitalism, that causes the withering of the Greek countryside..."

For the People!

"And the encyclical continues:

"The march towards subservience, the undermining of our national interests, the erosion of the popular sovereignty, the economic stagnation and the exploitation of the Greek worker must stop...

Greece, by all means, must get out of both the military and the political NATO alliance. Of course, all bilateral agreements which have allowed the Pentagon to turn Greece into a jumping-off point for pushing its expansionist policy, must be abrogated. But behind NATO, behind the American bases, are the monopolistic, multinational businesses and their domestic surrogates.'

"If all of Greece's woes are caused by the Americans, NATO and the West, then why are we waiting to leave their asphyxiating embrace as quickly as possible? If America and its Pentagon are sucking our lifeblood at all levels, if they are the reason for every misfortune, if they erode popular sovereignty, if they are to blame, along with the West, for all of our mishaps, then why wait?

"The second slogan of the declaration and goal of the Movement. As to how much PASOK respected the 'popular sovereignty' can be clearly seen from the composition of the government. Seventeen opportunists, cronies and emigres were appointed ministers and deputy ministers, while thousands of others were placed in enviable positions of the governmental apparatus. Which people, then?"

Middle Ages

"The will of the people made its decision in the 1981 elections. It elected its deputies, therefore, its government. About what 'popular sovereignty' and 'people to power' then does the declaration of 3 September 1974 speak? On what guest list of the people were those who have for decades lived in the 'accursed West' with dual citizenship?

"The 'Social Liberation and Democratic Process.' What was our social servitude in order to be able to comprehend our social liberation, which presupposes servitude? There were, of course, and there are various social injustices, but not servitude. We are not living in the Middle Ages. PASOK not only did not liberate anybody socially, on the contrary, it hatches social bonds, be it with the social system of 'living socialism' towards which it cast one eye--let us not forget the admiration of our premier for the social regime of Albania--, be it with the unknown Third World socialist system, which he promises because he does not believe in liberalism anyway, whether it is economic, social or even political.

"Now, as far as the democratic process is concerned, that is where he literally must be ashamed. What is the democratic process followed by PASOK? Why was the Socialist Party totally exonerated in the expulsion of its four deputies? What democratic process was used other than that of 'we decide and order'?

"It was a veritable shredding, then, of both the statute and the notorious declaration of 3 September in all of its components, with the hypocrisy of popular sovereignty on top. 'All power comes from the people, expresses the people and serves the people,' it says on page 18 of the declaration. And this was put into practice by some opportunists who had been promoted to high positions!

"'Freedom of thought and expression' promises on page 19 of the same encyclical. You saw this freedom in the case of the expelled deputies and in Kargopoulos with the other five who dared to speak their minds...

"'No bases, out of NATO, out of the EEC of the monopolies,' slogans for the implementation of the same declaration on national independence without which it is impossible to achieve the remaining goals of the declaration of 3 September. And they ended up: 'In NATO,' 'In EEC,' and 'with the bases' for at least 7 years. False and misleading slogans which underestimate and lower the intelligence of the Greek people to the level of the Afro-Asian people of 1800.

"The news media, the government press, all are together in a symphony of lies and demagoguery.

"The anniversary, then, of 3 September 1974. So that it will remind the Greek people of an event 'like a monument of untrustworthiness and fraud!' Either as a 'declaration of principles of 3 September 1974' or as a 'statute of the Movement,' or, finally, as a 'covenant of honor' between the people and PASOK, for which I do not have space to analyze its shredding; the dishonesty of PASOK has no precedent."

Petsos

Georgios Petsos, in referring to the deplorable distortion of the Change with a bitterness that reaches outrage, states:

"It is a fact that it is the founding declarations that define the identity of a party.

"PASOK, since its founding, shaped a program that was expressed and proclaimed correctly by its president, Andreas Papandreou, with the result that, within a very short time, its grandiose effect was demonstrated in its choice by the people.

"In essence, the content of these declarations was identified with what the people were seeking, the Great Change.

"It is true that after the victory of October 1981 the eyes and ears of the people followed the course of the new government, listened to its footsteps, and with exceptional maturity, every citizen awaited the implementation of the basic founding principles for the Change to be effected.

"The sage political statement of the premier on the day of PASOK's victory: 'We are a government of all Greeks' was demonstrating to every sincere Greek citizen that a new creative thrust was getting stronger, that political responsibilities, wisdom, honesty, sincerity and political daring were plotting the course of the nation.

"Thus, the Change, as a new political experience and as a vision, was taking on shining dimensions and was showing its perspective with perfect clarity.

"Unfortunately, however, this shining rainbow which was defined by the political expression 'Government of all Greeks' has darkened dangerously.

"Responsible for this are the self-proclaimed big shots and officials with no responsibilities who infiltrated the party and the administration; the dwarfs of the struggles and the goldbricks who crawled up the ladder of power like snakes and gained stature by reason of their position alone.

"Their historical responsibility is great and it weighs on many.

"The disaster they are causing not only grows dangerously, but, at the same time, is taking on dimensions of national disaster because they doom, by their actions, the aspirations of a people for industriousness and progress."

Without Shame

"Those responsible are the incompetent collaborators of the premier, who shamelessly and irresponsibly surface in the nerve centers of political power.

"Those responsible are the specialized 'mountebanks' of the party machinery, who weasel their way into the administration.

"Those responsible are the various carpet-baggers who have demonstrated to be champions in fortune-hunting, snitching and incompetence within the party and the administration, whose 'philosophy' is not socialist transformation and change, but their 'personal profit' because they never related to its meaning.

"For these and other reasons still, the change is distorted and its meaning is twisted.

"The people, though, see and live this distorted mirroring of its course through certain incompetents and adventurers who hold the reins of power.

"For this reason, the bitterness and the disappointment of those who believed in and struggled for PASOK are not only intense, but day by day increase and culminate in outrage."

On Crutches

"The people," Mr. Petsos closed, "can no longer justify the exercise of a policy which leads with mathematical certainty to a host of impasses.

"It cannot, in any case, justify the practice of an economic policy, which, independently of the good intentions of its leaders, becomes enmeshed in the gears of partisan rivalries with the result of not relying on a specific program, but on the crutches of various experiments of unlikely advisers, who ignore the sensibilities of the Market and the demands of the people.

"On the contrary, in the handling of serious foreign matters, and generally in foreign policy, deviations from the principles of the program can often be considered necessary and could not even be blamed, of course, as long as they are, in each specific instance, the only feasible solutions favorable to the national interest."

Mbouloukos

Lakonia deputy, Ar. Mbouloukos, in referring to the founding declaration of PASOK, observes:

"The founding of PASOK and the declaration of 3 September 1974 constituted the expression of the will of the people for a radical change in the way of governing the country. After a 7-year dictatorship, it was natural for our people to envision greater democracy. Besides, ever since the end of the civil war, Greek democrats had struggled zealously for a new way to govern the country. The universal demand of our people was for the disappearance of the painful remnants

of the two tragic internal conflicts which had led to the dictatorships of Metaxas and Papadopoulos and had left the marks of national disasters in our country's history.

"The flawless operation of democratic parliamentarianism, the end of segregating citizens into categories A and B, the replacement of favoritism and nepotism by merit in public life, freedom of the press and the impartiality of the news media of the state, the non-partisan character of the public administration and the free trade unionism, constituted, during that period, the great expectations of our people.

"All of us, then, who had struggled for democracy gathered together in PASOK and continued the political and parliamentary struggle for the materializing of the principles of the 3 September 1974 declaration.

"However, just a few months, after the access of PASOK to power, were sufficient to show that, unfortunately, the country was going in the opposite direction."

Those Considered Worthy

"Those who had actively stood up against the Junta were isolated and individuals who had had absolutely no involvement in the democratic and national struggles, even some who had been staffers and cooperators of Junta people, became cadres of the government and the state machinery. Those considered worthy in the conscience and preference of the people were isolated and those who govern today are persons, whom the people neither knew nor elected. Movement cadres and deputies, with a history of struggle, sacrifice and giving of themselves, were set aside, expelled or have been put on ice, men who for an entire lifetime were molded by the realities of Greece and the problems of the people. Instead, those who rule today are ignorant, brought in from abroad, 'apprentice magicians,' who are not only totally out of touch with the realities of Greece, but perhaps do not even have Greek citizenship solely."

Muzzling

"With the abolishment of: the ballot by cross by preference; the policing of deputies; the continued absence of the premier from the Chamber of Deputies; the rumors of illegal electoral systems; and the laws which allow the government to legislate by decree, the substance and the spirit of parliamentary democracy are hurt. The citizens are divided into two categories: the party members for whom all doors are open and the rest of the people who suffer due to the fickle and miserable failure of the economic policy of the ignorant."

"Nepotism and favoritism are rampant. The television, radio and the state's news media have shamelessly been transformed into party propaganda organs. The trade union movement has been muzzled and the public administration is being eroded by an ever-progressive partisanism to a degree never before known in the country.

Division

"With these facts, which even the most fanatical supporters of the premier cannot dispute, it is evident that we find ourselves before a dramatic betrayal of the principles of the declaration of 3 September 1974. I believe that never, until today, in the history of the country, have our people been so tragically betrayed. Not only because their expectations were betrayed and are betrayed, but because there is a real danger of returning to times of intolerance and division, to times of political corruption, of lack of merit and the adulteration of democracy in its functions.

"This is the bitter truth," Mr. Mbouloukos ends. "I am the first to feel sorry, but it is our duty to look at the truth head on."

9731

CSO:3521/444

DISSATISFACTION WITH PASOK REACHES PROVINCES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 17 Sep 83 p 3

[Text] New resignations and dismissals of local PASOK cadres have been noted in provincial cities. After Mytilini, where a new nomarchy committee has been appointed, in Preveza and Ioannina many members who disagree with the policy followed by the government on the bases issue have resigned.

An additional reason for the disagreements is the centralized and dictatorial--as they call it--tactic which the government and party leadership is following. The phenomena of local cadres strongly criticizing the leadership have multiplied in various cities following the conference of nomarchy committees which took place on 2 and 3 September at the "Intercontinental" hotel.

The main reasons why the party leadership is being reproached are the suppression of democratic processes in PASOK and the Papandreou family-state. In Ioannina, 140 party cadres have resigned in recent days, while in other cities contacts and meetings of cadres are being continued in order to deal with the "situation" which has developed.

Leadership's Fears

Despite the fact that in Mytilini it counteracted by appointing a new nomarchy committee, the party leadership appears cautious about applying the same method elsewhere because it is afraid this may lead to a new loss of party cadres. Also, they have information that members and cadres who disagree are maintaining close relations with KKE, which justifies, from one viewpoint, such a low tone in the Communist Party's criticism of the government.

Finally, the party leadership tried to organize demonstrations in support of the government for its disagreements with the EEC and United States, but it hesitated to give the order for them to be carried out. This was because it was afraid that whether the effort would succeed or where it would occur would be controlled absolutely by KKE.

9247

CSO: 3521/450

DOMESTIC, FOREIGN REPERCUSSIONS OF PASOK POLICIES

Political Losses

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18-19 Sep 83 pp 1,3

[Excerpts] The protests arriving at Kastri from ministers and parliamentarians over the political repercussions from the government's recent actions are intense and come from many sides. Most of the ministers and deputies believe--and several have conveyed this opinion of theirs to Prime Minister A. Papandreou--that the strategies on the issues of political cooperation with the nine EEC partners have irreparably harmed the government's political authority. These protests have evoked a series of reactions at the top level of the government where they are now ascribing responsibility for the "strategies" to the appropriate ministers who were in charge of dispatching the orders.

Scapegoats

The shots from the entourage of the prime minister and other ministers who participate in KYSEA [Government Council for National Defense] are aimed at the minister of foreign affairs, I. Kharalambopoulos, who they have chosen as a target and they charge: First, that he did not make the appropriate suggestions to Mr. Papandreou and did not present all the dimensions of the consequences of the Greek veto on the South Korean plane, and of its persistence on the Euromissiles and the Polish issue. And, second, that despite the fact that he "extorted" support for this stance, he undertook initiatives which exceeded the boundaries of what had been decided.

These accusations against Mr. Kharalambopoulos come from ministers, highly placed in the government hierarchy, who participate in KYSEA, and from people in the prime minister's close circle. In any case, the other parliamentarians are not accepting these accusations and consider all those who shared in the decisions responsible; they claim that this tactic of using someone as a scapegoat every time is leading precisely to the complete political unreliability of the prime minister himself.

The parliamentarians' criticism is also turning against the group of extra-parliamentary ministers who support third-world perceptions and closer contacts with these countries. In particular, they are indicating that the decision about participating in the conference which will take place at the initiative of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi was rash. This decision evoked intense reactions from China and other third-world countries who characterized it as having a pro-Soviet orientation. Among these countries are several Arab ones who do not have good relations at all with Moscow.

The answer from Kastris to these protests was that the decision was made because this was considered a pretext for the prime minister to be in the United States and to thus obtain a meeting with President Reagan. Moreover, for this reason the prime minister persisted in securing the other EEC members' representation at the Gandhi meeting, so that it would appear he was going to the United States as president of the Common Market and thus would have another reason for meeting with President Reagan, as has customarily happened every six months between the leader of the country exercising the presidency of the Community and the U.S. president.

After the Americans' unwillingness for the prime minister to meet with President Reagan and the isolationist stance which the Europeans maintained vis-a-vis the Greek Government, other thoughts began to prevail in Kastris, and to look for ways to back down. The cancellation of Mr. Papandreu's trip to New York was the first action but there still remains the problem of the great political damage which the government has suffered at home.

Plunge

The government ministers, deputies and many other functionaries who never had close relations with party agents note with fear the plunge of the prime minister's personal political influence. It is characteristic, they report, that all these days--which they call the worst, from a political standpoint, in the government's history--the sole supporters of the government have been the means of mass communication, while even pro-government newspapers are noting the negative aspects of the strategies.

In particular, they all point out the need for the government to immediately stop its third-world adventures in order to restore, to the degree it can and as much as it can--this is stressed openly by many parliamentarians--its authority domestically and abroad.

Allies Question Foreign Policy

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18-19 Sep 83 pp 1,3

[Article by I KATHIMERINI Paris correspondent Rikhardos Someritis]

[Excerpts] Paris--The Greek Government has every reason to explain with convincing arguments the real aims of its foreign policy. It should, in fact, proceed to this explanation as quickly as possible if it wants to reverse a most clearly negative current which is getting stronger, at Greece's expense, throughout Europe. Contrary to the assertions of certain government circles in Athens, as they are expressed in statements and journalistic "articles," this current so negative for PASOK's foreign policy (but also, consequently, for Greece) is not the work of a "Black International" or the representatives of two or three "rightist governments."

At this moment, the accumulation of "peculiarities"--which all have as a common characteristic the support of pro-Soviet positions, not Greek national interests--has been speculated upon (the word is too mild and does not evoke the exact atmosphere) by a very broad spectrum of political forces and governments.

The reactions of all the EEC foreign ministers at their recent meeting in Athens, and the reactions of essentially all the political leanings in the European Parliament (with the exception of certain--not all--of the European communists) on the issue of the South Korean Boeing, as well as the almost unanimous commentaries in the press, often independent of political and ideological placement, should have most deeply disturbed both PASOK and all the others.

The impressions, on one hand, and the publicly expressed opinions, on the other, actually coincide on one ascertainment: The concern of Greek foreign policy is strengthening Soviet positions. As LE MONDE stressed recently, this is really the common point between the activity of Greek diplomacy on the Euromissiles issue, its "mediations" on the Polish issue (not even the French communists were amazed, like the Greek Government, at the "liberal" nature of the Polish dictatorship's recent masquerades...) and the refusal to condemn Moscow for the execution of the 269 Boeing "spies."

Two 'Explanations'

Where impressions and opinions do not completely coincide is in the explanation. There are two "schools," two viewpoints, two explanations.

According to the first--which is more amicable for the Greek Government--all these initiatives of Mr. Papandreou and his colleagues (none has publicly expressed doubts...) have one purpose only: to satisfy KKE, thus partially satisfying Moscow, so that it lowers its flag (after the bases agreement and economic measures) and does not create "problems." Certain people believe that this policy has a second advantage also: It leaves the door open for an eventual governmental cooperation after the coming elections, if PASOK does not again secure a self-powered majority in the Chamber.

Naturally, this "explanation" does not strengthen the national prestige or the country's international credibility vis-a-vis the West or the East.

Blackmail Attempt

According to the second explanation--which, if it prevails, will create huge problems--Mr. Papandreou's pro-Soviet policy expresses PASOK's true inclination for a constant blackmailing of the great powers, according to the old Nasser prototype. The problem is that the great powers have analyzed this "game" for many years and effectively control it--often with tragic consequences for the "players" who, at any rate, start out from a "given:" They do not belong to a specific alliance.

Objectively and fundamentally, however, Greece is a member of NATO (both the political and military branch), of the European Community and all the western organizations. In addition, it hospitably receives important U.S. bases. The continuation in NATO, the continuation in EEC and the continuation of the bases were decided, in fact, by the present government. The question which is beginning to concern many people is that perhaps the goal of this decision was not to serve Greek national interests but to weaken the West.

It is clear that the grace period which had been secured by Greece, because it is Greece, and Mr. Papandreou--to be accomodated--is at an end. Up to what point will the stabilizing efforts of K. Karamanlis (rarely has a trip of his to Europe been so timely as the present one...) delay reactions and retributions on the part of our partners?

Greece (all its leaders) has stressed for years that it lives under the constant threat of Turkey. It pursues alliances, friends, supports. Or even the neutrality of those who would otherwise strengthen the adversary. The meaning of an independent policy, which is not necessarily synonomous to provocation, cannot be formulated for Greece without connection to this dramatic (and restrictive) parameter.

EEC Reported Exasperation

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18-19 Sep 83 p 16

[Text] "Out of EEC"--the persistent pre-electoral slogan of PASOK and Andreas Papandreou may not be, in the end, only a firework! Because suddenly now it has been rekindled. Only, the slogan has been transferred. That is, it stopped being heard in Greece after PASOK's climb to power and began to be heard, more and more powerfully and angrily and alarmingly in...Strasbourg. They say it to us now from there, with an opposite direction.

9247

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COUNTRY'S PRESTIGE LOSS SEEN IN INF DEPLOYMENT

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 22 Aug 83 p 1

[Text] The initiative of the government of A. Papandreou to the EEC (?) on postponing the stationing of the "Pershing" and "cruise" missiles could have been expected to surprise--and upset--most of the Nine countries. And of course this is not marked down to our credit. But if the virtually icy reactions of the recipients of the Kharalambopoulos letter (aside from being upsetting in their turn) truly surprised Athens, as the pro-government press intimates, then the matter would be infinitely worse. Because it would mean that after almost 2 years of governing the country, the tyro magicians of our "Change" have not yet learned even the fundamentals of foreign policy.

The unfortunate government spokesman kept on hemming and hawing something about a "historical step," following the cold shoulder which the delegation of "Change" received by Brussels, London, Bonn, the Hague, Lisbon, Rome--and more is to come, since the attitudes of socialist Paris or of the other European capitals are no different. But it would be more correct to speak about a "historical blunder," had it not been preceded by so many other blunders of the forces of the "Change" in the sector of foreign policy, so that it is difficult off-hand to decide which is the more historical--this or the previous ones? But that this was a blunder, and in fact a significant one, could not be seriously denied.

The decision about the stationing of American missiles if the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva fail had been made 3 years ago by the Atlantic Alliance. And it affirmed this decision 3 months ago, during the spring conference of the foreign ministers in Paris, with the usual reservations by I. Kharalambopoulos. Under the pressure of this "threat," in recent weeks the first signs of some softening of Soviet inflexibility had begun to appear. Was this the right hour for Athens, with its initiative, to disrupt the Atlantic front? It was not necessary for this to have been preceded by even indirect understandings with Moscow, as the KATHIMERINI correspondent in Paris points out. The benefit to the Soviets from this Greek action is so obvious that, based on legal procedure, any such evidence is superfluous.

The move of the luminaries of our PASOK diplomacy was not made to the appropriate body of NATO, but to the inappropriate EEC. Why? The government spokesman avoided explaining this to us. We will venture to do this ourselves. Evidently because we wanted to take advantage of the additional weight which our chairmanship of the Community gives us in this 6-month period, in order to strengthen the initiative. And this, along with the fact that we ourselves hastened to publicize our move, constitutes additional reasons why our partners have become upset. If we add further the factor that many European governments have to deal with rather powerful peace movements in their countries, one can understand how they were angered by the initiative by the government of another European country--one which, in fact, has the luxury of speaking without any risk, since there has been no decision to station missiles on Greek soil.

For all these reasons, we have been especially upsetting. To both those who have spoken already and to those who have not spoken. Not only to the conservatives, as the pro-government press tries to restrict this--a press whose propagandistic "visions" are continuously being refuted by events. But also to our kindred socialists--unless Mitterrand, Craxi, and Soares are considered to adhere to the "accursed Right" themselves! The advocacy of Billy Brandt is not going to change anything. Nor, of course, is it going to save an initiative which was shipwrecked even before it was developed and discussed. The only thing remaining to be seriously examined is the interpretation of E. Averof--about a move aimed to distract from domestic difficulties--in conjunction also with the kindred interpretations about an "offsetting" after the initialing of the agreement on the retention of the American bases. But whatever the true reasons are which prompted the government to set off this bombshell (an attempt to appease Moscow and/or the KKE and its leftist electoral clientele in Greece?), the international cost from the failure of its move is not small. It is not customary for governments to take initiatives on the great issues of foreign policy without having studied and prepared them well, so that they do not draw a blank. We fear that the shipwreck of the initiative by the Greek chairmanship and the reactions which it has caused have compromised not only the government of "Change." They have also compromised the country on the international scene.

12114

CSO: 3521/430

POLITICAL

GREECE

EAST BERLIN, ATHENS MAYORS MEETING

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Aug 83 p 2

[Article by M. Neofotistou]

[Excerpt] "Marriages are performed in this hall, and so you understand that our meeting here has a symbolic character," said the mayor of Athens, Dimitrios Beis, to his colleague from the capital of the German Democratic Republic, Erhard Krack, at a press conference held yesterday in the Cultural Center of the municipality of Athens. Nevertheless he did not explain what formula will be found for the political marriage of Berlin's neutral gender and the feminine gender of Athens.

In any case, aside from symbolisms the two mayors decided to sign a protocol of cooperation between Athens and Berlin, while a municipal delegation from our capital will visit Berlin soon in order to study the system of municipal enterprises there which, as Krack said yesterday to the journalists, has been in operation throughout the 35 years of the GDR's existence and which is enormously successful: Home-construction enterprises, theatrical enterprises, small and intermediate enterprises, and so forth and so on, which bring in to the municipality 40 billion marks per year, with the trends being upward (an increase this year of 5 percent in comparison to the previous year).

12114

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WISDOM SEEN NECESSARY IN FACING CYPRUS ISSUE

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 Aug 83 p 5

[Excerpts] What the summit deliberations of the Greek and Cypriot leadership held in Athens last Thursday demonstrated chiefly and fundamentally is the seriousness and criticality of the juncture at which the Cyprus problem finds itself at this moment. In reality, throughout the 9 years which have passed since that tragic and terrible summer of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Cyprus problem has remained unchanged and without any progress, the reason being that the Turkish side not only has ignored the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations, but also has not even seriously dealt with the search for a reasonable and generally acceptable solution which would not be the consolidation and legitimization of the "faits accomplis" based on an illegitimate and internationally condemned force of arms. Because its sole aspiration has been precisely this consolidation. Now for the first time the initiative which has been taken by United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar is creating some chance for serious negotiation on a search for a solution which could be generally acceptable and be something substantially and organically different from the "faits accomplis."

As we have already observed, the secretary general of the United Nations would not jeopardize his authority and reputation by undertaking an action which might be doomed in advance, had he not specific and important indications and encouragements on the part of those powerful factors in the international arena on which Turkey depends and which are in a position to be listened to in Ankara. And this is the element which fundamentally differentiates the present initiative of the U. N. secretary general from the "efforts" or "moves" made up to now, which have not gone anywhere.

It seems that these powerful factors have certain reasons to want a solution to the Cyprus problem--a solution which can be generally acceptable and is viable, because otherwise it would not be a solution.

This new element gives to the initiative of de Cuellar its importance, and its criticality, given the present circumstances. It is not that it is certain in advance that the effort of the secretary general of this international organization will succeed. Indeed, on the contrary. Its outcome is uncertain. But on its outcome--positive or negative--will depend in many ways the fate of the Cypriot Greek community.

This is why the government of Cyprus, in cooperation and in communication with the Greek leadership, is studying and treating with extreme seriousness and circumspection the famous informal text which constitutes the initial and preparatory phase of the effort by the U. N. secretary general. It is weighing with extreme care and sense of responsibility the repercussions and consequences of this or that position not only with respect to parts or the whole of this document, but also--fundamentally and essentially--with respect to the initiative of the secretary general itself. Any acceptance of frameworks or settlements which would mortgage the future and the existence of the Greek-Cypriot people or any betrayal of their vital rights and interests is out of the question. But also--as we already stressed recently--any negative position at the outset which is not substantiated vis-a-vis the initial approaches and above all the entire initiative of the secretary general of this international organization would be not only a tactical but also a substantive mistake. Because it would give propaganda arguments to the "other" side and would deprive the Greek side of certain of its international supporters. But at the same time it would also constitute an ignoring and discounting of the "dynamics" which we referred to above--and in fact would be lacking any countervailing supporters in the international arena--and this would not be without consequences.

All these things do not signify a leaning towards "capitulation." On the contrary. Any proposals or plans for settlements or intentions which are believed to be likely to mortgage the existence of the Greek-Cypriot people will not be accepted. But the positions, counter-proposals, and counter-suggestions of the Greek side must on the one hand be substantiated and irreproachable with respect to their logic and good faith, and on the other hand be courteous and diplomatic in their wording and in their form.

The negotiation will be both long and arduous, with ups and downs and uncertain outcomes. But as we have said, the situation is critical, precisely because it is in conjunction with a broader "dynamics" which cannot easily be ignored. And for this reason--we repeat--any hasty or mistaken actions, or rifts in domestic unity or in the cooperation of the two branches of Hellenism, the Greek and the Cypriot, would have consequences which might be deadly.

12114
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LEFT, PROGRESSIVE PARTIES ENCOURAGED BY LOCAL ELECTION GAINS

Conservatives Drop by Five Percent

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Sep 83 p 49

[Text] The Conservatives were burned when armchair voters remained sitting at home and opponents mobilized in this year's municipal and county elections. The largest government party had a decline of over 5 percent compared to the results of the 1981 Storting election; the coalition parties, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, did better than many had feared. The Progressive Party and the Labor Party won the year's political bout with gains of 3.8 and 3.3 percent respectively, measured against the 1979 elections.

This means that the Labor Party, with the help of the Socialist-Left Party and to some extent the Liberal Party, regained a number of lost positions. This is true of the leadership of the county councils in Ostfold, Telemark, Nordland and Troms and possibly in Sor-Trondelag as well. There the Liberals have the "swing vote," just as they do in Buskerud--where the party will decide Thursday whether there will continue to be a nonsocialist county chairman at the beginning of next year or whether there will be a socialist in charge. Gro Harlem Brundtland's party already had a clear majority in Hedmark and Oppland and now they have made a "clean sweep" in Finnmark too.

The nonsocialists fought on shifting fronts in around 60 municipalities, among them Tromso and Skien (where the Conservatives have the chairmanship) in addition to Kristiansund N (where the Liberals hold that position).

The Progressive Party, which did not nominate candidates in all districts, made sharp inroads in many places on the number of solid Conservative areas. Municipalities like Sandefjord and Baerum can serve as examples of this. Those in sympathy with Carl I. Hagen will be moving onto municipal councils and county councils around the country in earnest at the beginning of next year--and will undoubtedly know how to make their presence felt. The party also made a strong showing in Oslo with a gain of over 5 percent and a doubling of its city council seats--from 4 to 8. With that kind of support behind it, FRP [Progressive Party] seems likely to occupy a place on the

municipal board in the capital. If other things remain uncertain, one thing is clear: the chairman will continue to be Albert Nordengen.

When prominent Conservatives talk about the party having "leaked" at both ends in this year's election, one of the things they have in mind is that the Progressive Party increased its support by 3.8 percent in the county council elections.

Apart from that, the Labor Party's somewhat weaker gains--and the Conservative Party's loss of 3.6 percent--not many changes occurred in the county council elections. The Christian People's Party and the Center Party declined by 1.4 and 1.3 percent respectively. Both SV [Socialist-Left Party] and the Red Election Alliance made gains--of 0.8 and 0.4 percent respectively while the Liberals lost 0.9 percent and the Liberal People's Party 0.5 percent. Finally the Norwegian Communist Party became even weaker, dropping from 0.5 to 0.4 percent.

If we had had a Storting election instead, the indications are that the Labor gains would have given a socialist majority once again, since SV maintained its position.

However it is 2 years before we have the next national political test of strength. Prominent Conservatives have already declared that they will make every effort to have a substantially better showing then--led by Prime Minister Kare Willoch, who obviously by no means considers the battle lost.

Unemployment Seen Hurting Government

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 14 Sep 83 p 6

[Text] There is now a socialist majority in seven counties. Finnmark, Hedmark and Oppland already had a socialist majority before the elections. Now Troms, Nordland, Ostfold and Telemark have been added. In Sor-Trondelag the Liberals are in the deciding position, without having indicated which side they will land on. In Buskerud the race is so close that it will have to be decided by the final vote count.

The Conservative decline was especially large in the five counties where unemployment has increased the most in the past year. They are Aust-Agder, More og Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane, Vestfold and Hordaland.

The election results also meant a power shift in 60 municipalities and four counties, namely Ostfold, Telemark, Nordland and Troms. In Sor-Trondelag the Liberals are in the deciding position, but before the election the party said it would support the Labor Party. The Liberals might also have a

deciding position in Buskerud, but the final vote count was still going on there on Tuesday. But it came as no surprise that Nord-Trondelag did not change from a nonsocialist to a socialist majority.

The Labor Party can note gains in all the nation's county. Also in the "red bastions" of Hedmark and Finnmark the party managed to strengthen its position. And in Finnmark it got a clear majority. There the Labor Party did especially well in the election with a gain of 10.1 percent. The socialist wing also had a very good election in the two other counties in North Norway. In Troms the Labor Party gained 5.5 percent and in Nordland, 5.7 percent.

Labor Gains in the West

The Labor Party also made strong gains in the western part of the country. In More og Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane and Hordaland, the gains were over 4 and 5 percent. In Vest-Agder the Labor Party climbed as much as 6.1 percent.

At the same time, the Conservatives slipped sharply in counties like More og Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane and Hordaland. In the last county, as much as 8.5 percent. It is interesting to note here that these are counties where unemployment has risen substantially more than the national average. But this is most pronounced in Aust-Agder, where there has been an increase in unemployment of 3.7 percent in the past year. Here the Conservatives declined by 7.8 percent

Shift in 60 Municipalities

It is highly probable that the Labor Party will have 60 new town council chairmen on 1 January of next year. The party now has 143 chairmen. This includes Skien, among others, and probably Tromso as well. But there the party is dependent on the Red Election Alliance which is setting political conditions. Other municipalities that were regained by the Labor Party were Kragero, Trondheim, Sauda and Alta. Both the Conservatives and the middle parties appear to have been hit by their handling of the big industrial issues that caused temperatures to rise in the spring. In Odda (Tyssedal) the Conservatives dropped from 1,069 to 695 votes, while the Labor Party climbed from 1,867 to 2,624 votes.

Will Return

Ivar Leveraas, secretary of the Labor Party, pointed to the party's strong gains in a number of towns as one of the most encouraging signs in the election. In Hammerfest, where the Labor Party already had over 50 percent of the votes, the party gained another 12 percent.

"A party secretary could not ask for more," said Leveraas. He also pointed out that the Labor Party had solid election results in the typical industrial sites.

"I do not take it for granted that the results would have been the same if more voters had turned up, but the election results show in any case that it is possible for the Labor Party to make a comeback in the Storting election 2 years from now," he said. Leveraas did not think his party had made any serious mistakes during the election campaign.

"We were able to concentrate the debate on our major issues: jobs, housing and health. And although many people may have become confused by a lot of different figures, people did become aware that two different strategies for dealing with these problems were involved."

Union Federation Satisfied

The LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] leadership is satisfied with the election results, even though the gains of the Progressive Party dampened the enthusiasm somewhat.

"We view the election results as a clear signal to Prime Minister Kare Willoch that efforts to combat unemployment need to be stepped up," said LO secretary Ole Knapp.

Would Mean Storting Majority for Left

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Sep 83 p 5

[Article by Morten Malmø]

[Text] If the county council elections had been a Storting election, the Labor Party and SV would have received a majority--but the barest possible majority in Storting. The two parties would have had 78 seats compared to 77 held by the nonsocialists. The Labor Party would have won eight seats and the Conservatives would have lost nine, but won one. The Conservative win would have resulted in Center parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl being forced to quit his job in Lovebakken.

The Labor Party would have taken Conservative seats in seven counties, namely in Ostfold, Hedmark, More og Romsdal, Nordland, Oppland, Telemark and Hordaland. In two counties, the Conservatives would have lost seats to the Progressive Party, namely Oslo and Vestfold. That would have thrown Storting representatives Per-Kristian Foss and Ingrid I. Willoch out of work. The Conservative loss of seats would also have led two cabinet ministers in the former all-Conservative government to leave Storting. They are Johan C. Loken from Hedmark and Inger Koppernaes from More og Romsdal. The Labor Party--if we had had a county council [as published] election now--would have taken one seat from the Christian People's Party in Nordland and that would have meant that Halvar Johan Hansen (Labor) from Harstad would have taken a Storting seat from Per Aas, who is also from Harstad.

Such a calculation, which is based on 99.9 percent of the votes being counted in all counties, would have given this distribution of seats in Storting: Labor Party 74 (+8), SV 4 (unchanged), Conservative Party 45 (-8), Christian People's Party 14 (-1), Center Party 10 (-1), Liberal Party 2 (unchanged) and Progressive Party 6 (+2).

Large Conservative Election Organization

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabo]

[Text] Conservative voters want Conservative policies, not middle-spectrum policies. For the nation's dominant government party, the election results were a clear indication that there are cracks at the local level. The enormous Conservative election organization has been dealt a severe blow. There is an urgent need to find the mistakes and shape a strategy prior to the decisive 1985 election. In this context, the Conservatives cannot avoid a showdown with the Progressive Party. At the same time Conservative voters must realize that politics cannot exist without compromises as long as no one party has a Storting majority.

The Conservative Party was the big loser in the election, along with the opinion institutes which failed to predict the party's decline. A decline of 3.7 percent compared to the 1979 election and 5.5 percent compared to the 1981 election should lead to some soul searching.

Yesterday was the morning after for leading Conservative representatives. As usual, Prime Minister Kare Willoch met with his closest colleagues in the morning and at 1 o'clock the party's working committee met. It was not a gathering of wet blankets but of professional politicians in search of a strategy that will produce an election victory in 1985.

In a commentary on the election yesterday, party chairman Jo Benkow said that the Conservatives had lost votes both to the Labor Party and to the Progressive Party. That fact alone involves an enormous challenge. Added to that was the low election participation of around 67 percent--the lowest since World War II.

It is not an unreasonable theory to assume that many of those who stayed home voted for the Conservatives in 1979 and 1981. Why did they stay home?

One possibility is that many Conservative voters do not feel that their expectations have been met. When Kare Willoch took over as prime minister in 1981 a great pressure of expectations was placed on his shoulders. This expectation burden was easier to bear when the Conservative Party held government power alone than it was after the Willoch government was re-structured this June.

In any case, there is reason to believe that a lot of the air went out of the local Conservatives after the government was formed. The mood at the Conservative congress this spring was very clear: Why talk about a three-party government when we are doing so well on our own? This widespread view at the congress showed that some Conservative deputies see politics more as a game than as a formidable task aimed at implementing as much as possible of the party's policies.

Both Prime Minister Kare Willoch and party chairman Jo Benkow stressed in very plain language after the election defeat that the cooperation with the Christian People's Party and the Center Party would remain intact. There are no other viable cooperation models on the national political level. These statements mean that the party must go within itself and explain to the local groups the need for broad cooperation.

Benkow has admitted that the Conservatives were unable to mobilize prior to Monday's election. A good deal of the reason for this is probably that it is hard for a government party that has to defend austerity programs and unpopular measures instead of being able to swing away in the opposition to mobilize voters. Thus the task of mobilizing is much greater for those in power than for those in the opposition. Here the Conservatives did not succeed.

The Conservatives must now look to the future. Jo Benkow said yesterday that one of the mistakes that was made in the election campaign was that the party may have talked too much about the past. Instead of hammering out a policy for the future, the campaign was to a much too large extent a dispute over earlier errors in Norwegian politics. Jo Benkow's promise that the Conservative Party will focus on future policies in the next election campaign will be greeted with enthusiasm.

The Progressive Party probably took a good helping from the Conservatives' plate in Monday's election. In many areas the Progressive Party wants the same thing as the Conservatives in Norwegian politics. The difference is that the Progressive Party wants a quicker tempo and does not want to pay much attention to the social aspects of economic measures. This involves a new challenge for the Conservatives. It must be explained that it will take time to implement the economic measures.

The showdown with the Progressive Party could be painful for the Conservatives. Not least because opinion polls have shown that a very large number of Conservative voters view the Progressive Party as a real alternative. Therefore this will be a balancing act that will require great skill to prevent the showdown from causing even more voters to go over to Carl I. Hagen.

The possibility cannot be excluded that the election results in themselves have aroused a good many Conservative voters who in one way or another wanted to give the Conservative Party a warning in the election. Many of them are probably regretting their protest today and the party's leadership and high-level officials should take this as the challenge it is.

Many Voters Stayed Home

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Sep 83 p 3

[Interview with election expert and local politician Helge Seip by Eivind G. Karlsen and Terje Svabo; date and place not given]

[Text] "National politics can be a 'dynamo' for interest in local elections, but one must present the connection between matters on the different levels better than was done in this year's election." Helge Seip suggested this as one of the reasons for the low voter turnout, but also pointed to changes in social structure--more older and new younger voter groups--in addition to the long-term effects of the big-city model and a mentality of inertia in some parts of the country as other factors. The Conservative decline was partly due to the fact that they have had voters "on credit" from other parties, he said.

[Question] How would you explain the opinion polls from before the election and the election returns themselves?

[Answer] We have seen the special situation that the opinion polls simply did not register the big shifts between the Labor Party and the Conservatives. Neither did the opinion poll on the municipal elections which NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] conducted for AFTENPOSTEN as late as the Friday before the election. On the contrary, it left the readers in happy or unhappy ignorance of what was in store on Monday. This should lead us to consider whether the methods are usable when it comes to national polls too.

[Question] The election result of only 68 percent has been hotly discussed. What is the reason for such low participation in local elections?

[Answer] Now we should bear in mind that in recent elections, the turnout in local elections has been substantially lower than it has been for Storting elections. It looks as if the mobilization possibilities in local elections are generally smaller than in Storting elections. I think some people are overdramatizing the decline this year, although of course it is deplorable and perhaps somewhat unexpected.

Big Cities

If we are looking for factors leading to lower election participation in municipal elections, we should first recall the trend toward larger municipalities which probably involve people somewhat less directly. The big-city model has been a long-term factor that has had a negative effect on voter turnout.

In addition there is the age composition of eligible voters. We have over twice as many over 80 years of age as we had 20 to 30 years ago and new, younger age groups have been involved in recent elections.

The age groups where one might expect lower election participation have become larger. All this points in the direction of a certain trend with lower voter participation.

In addition there is the question of whether one is able to mobilize sufficient interest in municipal elections and in that context one can ask if the municipalities themselves have so little elbow room that they are not very interesting for that reason. I think this is especially important in county council elections, where popular rule has been equipped with a level that does not have the necessary opportunities for action.

[Question] In the election, the Labor Party made bigger gains in North Norway and West Norway than in the rest of the country. What is the reason for these geographic differences?

'Borrowed' Voters

[Answer] The reasons are complex. One of the factors is that when the Conservative Party made such strong gains in recent elections, the party had some voters "on loan." In addition it has something to do with mentality. It is hard work to stimulate big groups far out in the wings in Trondelag and Hedmark and Oppland, where the effects were much smaller. The population of North Norway is perhaps somewhat more emotional. I think the situation in the western part of the country is that so many people changed parties in the last election and have not yet become established in a new party relationship.

A special element is provided by election returns from districts where there are threatened industries, such as Sor-Varanger, Fauske, Tysfjord and Tyssedal, while it is hard to detect the partisan element in Slemmestad because a special slate turned up there. Unemployment probably affected the election results in Ostfold too.

[Question] Well, can we sum things up by saying that the high unemployment rate is the reason for the Conservative decline?

[Answer] That is one factor, but I think it is much too simplistic to say that it is the only one.

[Question] Is it correct to say that the Labor Party won on the unemployment issue?

[Answer] Yes. It has been a general experience through the years that voters have more confidence in the Labor Party than in the Conservatives when it comes to being active on unemployment problems. The voters have reasoned in this way ever since the years between the two world wars.

[Question] If the unemployment figures do not go down before the 1985 Storting election, will Kare Willoch lose the election?

[Answer] I would say again that this is not the only decisive factor, but if the employment picture gets even worse, it will be harder for a government in power to go through another election campaign and retain its majority.

Another element that will have an effect is the entire complex area surrounding nursing and care with the shift in age groups that we are experiencing.

[Question] It is strange that highly predictable problems--or so one would think--seem to come as a shock to the popularly-elected representatives.

[Answer] I agree that it is strange. Here we have had a planned economy for 40-50 years, 4-year plans and perspective analyses. But when it comes to educational opportunities and nursing and care for the elderly, there are shortcomings anyway. That is something all parties should make a note of--perhaps in the form of asking whether we are so concerned with everything new that we almost forget the basic needs that are the very prerequisite if people are to live in a satisfactory manner in our society.

[Question] Would you say that the planned economy has failed--or do you think it is "just" a serious problem?

[Answer] It is the latter, at any rate.

Election Expert Seip Comments

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Sep 83 p 3

[Interview with Helge Seip by Eivind G. Karlsen and Terje Svabo]

[Text] The Conservative Party was unable to mobilize its voters. There was no national political struggle as there is in Storting elections. In this year's municipal and county elections, it appears on the contrary that Willoch's and Benkow's party was the victim of a mixture of local protests and disappointment over promises that could be fulfilled only partially--resulting in a lack of involvement and a good deal of nonparticipation in the election.

Helge Seip agreed that these elements should be regarded as part of the answer when we asked:

[Question] What was the reason for the Conservative decline?

[Answer] A party that is running the government confronts several problems in an election, among them the problem of retaining the interest of younger age groups. I also think there are clear elements of frustration which contributed quite strongly in some places to the increased support for the Progressive Party. Baerum and Sandefjord can serve as examples of this. But FRP also took votes away from the Labor Party. But I am not ignoring the fact that the conservative wave, in the sense of support for the Conservative Party, has reached a saturation point in some places.

[Question] There may also have been frustration in connection with the promises from 1981, which the Conservatives have been unable to fulfill, perhaps least of all with the minority government.

[Answer] Some Conservative voters have probably emphasized that. It is interesting to see that the middle parties did so well too, including the Christian People's Party and the Center Party which have joined the government. With its initiative to expand the government, the Center Party gained a better point of departure for the election than anyone had expected just half a year ago and it pulled KRF [Christian People's Party] along with it--despite internal rifts in that party, so that KRF had smaller losses on the national scale.

[Question] What do you think of the Progressive Party gains?

[Answer] The party got even more votes than most people had expected, as well as a shift in balance, since Oslo has now become its strongest district, while before this place was held by the oil county, Rogaland. The most noteworthy thing about the voting picture in Oslo is how FRP has made its mark as a kind of "east side conservative party," with 13.3 percent of the vote in the old part of the inner city, among other things.

From Labor to Progressive

This indicates a structure that shows that it is not just the Conservatives who are being recruited to the Progressive Party. It is being expanded with a very balanced mass of voters: I stood on a platform alongside one of their people who had been a Labor voter. That is not uncommon.

[Question] In that context, do you see any danger in the fact that in some districts FRP and the Red Election Alliance are relatively large parties?

[Answer] Yes, I think that is a mixture of frustration and polarization that would be of great concern if it turned up to a greater extent. Certain aspects of polarization are reminiscent of the 1930's when I made my own political debut in Oslo. I feel that, although I would not equate the ideologies. Both parties are pronounced elements of confrontation in some districts.

[Question] What about FRP leader Carl I. Hagen, who gives his party stronger exposure than any other party leader?

[Answer] He certainly does. In the first place he has a way of presenting things simply and in a form that makes people believe they have understood his message. He also makes a generally favorable impression when he appears. In addition to this, Hagen planned a very definite strategy prior to this election with a view to making himself accepted as part of a cooperation. I think he did so with considerable "diplomacy," first and foremost in relationship to the Conservative Party.

Hagen's success--or problems--in the future will depend on how that situation is handled by those to whom he is trying to attach himself more strongly.

[Question] Can Hagen and FRP run into the pressure of expectations in the next round?

[Answer] Yes and Hagen cannot go on playing his double role for long, saying that he is not responsible--while at the same time sitting with groups that could hold the balance of power in a number of municipal councils.

[Question] Do you think the conservative wave has stopped--of course that is also a broader concept that includes FRP?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Progressive Party is an offshoot of the conservative wave and that--by standing there as a much greater threat to the Conservatives as a party than it was before--it could have an impact on Conservatives policies. In that situation I personally feel that it is an advantage for the Conservatives to be solidly rooted in a three-party coalition because it will force the government party to maintain the more central course the party has followed in the last decade, even though that might lead to some temporary shifts to a more right-wing party.

Conservative Strategy

[Question] Then you agree with Prime Minister Kare Willoch and others in the Conservative Party who stressed that the election outcome showed that the coalition had to be continued?

[Answer] I think it is a wise Conservative strategy, even if it might not give the biggest vote results in 1985, since it will provide a very solid foundation, much more so than if the party allows itself to be carried away by this special Hagen wave. I also think it is correct when one looks at the development in the Labor Party. That party's growth, viewed relatively and in terms of seats held, represents a challenge that no one can ignore, of course.

Low Participation

[Question] Yes, the Labor Party gains are indisputable, even though the number of votes cast was nothing to shout about.

[Answer] No, but as I said one has to take into consideration here the generally lower turnout which does not affect just one party alone. It is possible that remaining at home as a deliberate political reaction has been more noticeable in this election than it has been in the past. I think this is correct, but it was most tangible for the Conservatives. Both that and the fact that the Conservative Party was not in a national political struggle could have made it harder to mobilize the voters. The Labor Party, which traditionally has problems with low voter turnout, did much better, at any rate. I also thought the Labor Party would make some gains. If one looks at the whole election campaign, the voters must have felt that the Labor Party was on the offensive in areas that involved people.

[Question] Are you thinking of unemployment?

[Answer] Yes, that in particular, but I am also thinking of the problems in the social and health sector where things are beginning to be critical. And as an opposition party for the first time in many years, it probably also had increased support from young people.

Better for Labor Party, But--

[Question] On the basis of this election, how would you evaluate the Labor Party's chances in 1985?

[Answer] It is too early to say anything definite about that. But there is hardly any doubt that Labor will have a better starting point for regaining government power than before this year's election. It is something else that the Labor Party--with less than 40 percent now--no longer has any reasonable grounds for expecting that it alone could come in a majority position. I think we are looking at an entirely open situation prior to the 1985 Storting election, a situation that is actually less clear than it was before this election.

[Question] With respect to both constellations and outcome?

[Answer] Yes, but I do not think the Labor Party can get a majority on its own, so that its chances depend on having an SV phalanx of some sort at its side and perhaps also on which strategy the Liberal Party chooses.

Conservatives Meet on Strategy

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Sep 83 p 3

[Text] The day after the election, Prime Minister Kare Willoch called a strategy meeting with his closest colleagues in his office for the purpose of discussing the election results and planning a strategy for the 1985 election. An important conclusion was that the Conservatives should not change their policy in the direction desired by the Progressives. The prime

minister also stressed in his commentary that it is not surprising for a government party to decline in an intermediate election. But Progressive Party leader Carl I. Hagen has said that his party is "on target" when it comes to its goal for the next election in 1985, which is based on getting 14 Storting representatives elected.

Labor Party Also Lost Votes to Hagen

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Eivind G. Karlsen and Terje Svabo]

[Text] The Progressive Party also took voters away from the Labor Party, but in Oslo it stands as an "east side conservative party." The Conservative decline was due to frustration and stay-at-home voters, local protests and temporary voter shifts. The Labor Party on the offensive and the middle parties came out of the election better than anticipated. But the Labor Party should not set its heart on recapturing government power in 1985--without the help of SV and perhaps the Liberals as well.

AFTENPOSTEN asked election expert and local politician, director Helge Seip, to talk about what happened in Monday's election in his opinion--and what he thinks the prospects are. Seip maintained among other things that the Labor Party's situation now makes developments in the Socialist-Left Party and the Liberal Party especially interesting. The Labor Party's gains this year were not big enough in themselves to justify great optimism.

With regard to the Conservative decline, Seip reminded us of the party's great gains in the 1979 election. At that time the Conservatives won over a good many voters who did not feel strong ties to the party. In addition, the Conservatives probably attracted the strongest expressions of frustration, local protests and to some extent promises that they have been unable to live up to.

"The government party was not good enough at transforming national policy into local policy," said Seip. He also said that all parties had to take the consequences of the fact that society is not covering basic needs in such areas as nursing, care and educational opportunities--though politicians for decades now have had a planned economy, 4-year plans and perspective analyses on which to base their actions. This too may have touched off frustration and lower election participation. But Seip did not want to overdramatize the low voter turnout of around 68 percent: It is common for fewer people to take part in local elections than in Storting elections.

Hagen Buoyant After Progressives' Victory

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Sep 83 p 3

[Interview with Progressive Party leader Carl I. Hagen by Thorleif Andreassen on 13 September 1983 at Hagen's home]

[Text] "We believe in an objective understanding between the Progressive Party and the other nonsocialist parties in a great many town and county councils. This understanding will emerge gradually. In a few places I am counting on a formal cooperation with the Conservative Party. We intend to pursue a serious policy." Those remarks were made by Progressive Party chairman Carl I. Hagen after his party emerged from the election with stronger support. "We are on target with respect to our goal of 14 Storting representatives in 1985," Hagen told AFTENPOSTEN.

[Question] What does a gain of 3.7 percent mean for the daily work of the Progressive Party?

[Answer] In a nutshell, it means three things--an enormous challenge, increased responsibility and better working conditions.

[Question] What is your strategy for town and county councils?

[Answer] We will try to follow up on our five most important issues in the local election program.

[Question] And what are those most important issues?

[Answer] An all-out effort in the area of care for the elderly. The use of private firms and organizations to solve problems rather than appointing separate groups of people to deal with them in the public sector. The sale of municipal properties that are not needed for municipal operation. An affirmative phase in the implementation of all legislation. The pursuit of a restrained economic policy in the counties by adjusting outlays to match resources.

[Question] But it has been necessary to pursue a restrained economic policy in the counties already, Hagen.

[Answer] It has been necessary for some time. But it has not been done.

[Question] How will the Progressive Party make any impact with its policies in the towns and counties when the Christian People's Party, the Center Party and the Liberal Party will not work together with your party?

[Answer] I think an objective understanding will develop between FRP and the other nonsocialist parties after work in the county councils gets going on 1 January of next year.

[Question] Why do you think that?

[Answer] Local politics is different from national politics. Conditions for practical cooperation there are different from what the public hears about. If KRF, SP [Center Party] or the Liberal Party need our votes to pass a regulation plan by entering into a compromise with us on a change at some juncture, then they will do so.

[Question] So FRP is prepared for compromises and flexibility?

[Answer] Naturally our local groups will advance our party's primary proposals. The other nonsocialist parties will also do that. The parties will have to get together and find a compromise solution that is better than the Labor Party's proposal. That is responsibility--replied a relaxed Carl I. Hagen, happy that the election campaign is over.

(We rang the doorbell at the home of the election's victor at 10:30 yesterday morning. Finally the house came to life. Husband and wife had slept soundly after having gone to bed only 5 hours before, with a break in their sleep to bring the children to school. The FRP chairman led an extremely active election campaign around the country.)

[Hagen] When you woke me up I was in the middle of a dream. I was driving at top speed to catch a night train.

I stopped smoking last night. That was no dream, said Hagen who stretched out in his easy chair in his new home on Bestumveien. He has become several kilograms lighter during the campaign. Therefore it may be with a clearer conscience that he can ask for cakes for lunch.

Over a cup of coffee, Carl I. Hagen pointed out that the gains for his party involve increased responsibility.

[Question] Does that also mean more responsibility?

[Answer] We are placing great emphasis on training our elected representatives--both in concrete work and in the effects of the work they are doing for the party. We are vulnerable to so-called random kicks, the party chairman admitted.

[Question] So you are guaranteeing responsible municipal policy on FRP's part?

[Answer] We are recommending that our people stress well-thought-out proposals and, especially important, that these can be implemented in practical politics. That is responsibility.

(Hagen kept on repeating that he found the Conservative decline highly regrettable.)

[Question] How can you regret it when your party undoubtedly got votes from former Conservative voters?

[Answer] We have received Conservative votes. But that is not the reason for the decline. Conservative people have failed to show up in polling places in silent protest, in the view of FRP's biggest votegetter, who went on to say: The fire will return to the Conservative Party during the Storting election.

Therefore the Conservatives should not be too disappointed. The next opinion polls will probably show the party up around 30 percent again.

(As a forecaster, Carl I. Hagen has good credentials. Back at the FRP national congress in May he claimed that the party would have increased influence in this election--and that FRP would be the joker in the election deck in some places. At the time, people shrugged at these statements, especially in Conservative circles. Today Hagen stresses that his party is on target for reaching the long-term goal in 1985--a further gain of about 2 percent and 14 Storting representatives for the Progressive Party.)

Progressives Expand Organizational Structure

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Excerpts] The Progressive Party is beefing up its organizational apparatus. This is proceeding quickly, in step with the party's gains. Education is the key word in the internal buildup strategy. Local politicians will be drilled, the party intends to be taken seriously. "We must prevent the good election results from ending in a political backlash in 1985." This point was made by the party's organizational leader, Bjorn Gotheim, in a talk with AFTENPOSTEN.

We paid a visit to the new Progressive Party premises at Kongens Gate 6. After having had just a few rooms at its disposal, the central party organization now has well over 300 square meters to run around in. It is true that there is not much furniture at the moment, but there seems to be plenty of technical equipment.

"We do not need quite so much room now. But we will be needing it," said Gotheim.

Gotheim himself has nothing to do with policy. "I run the store. The working committee meets every 2 weeks. Then I am told what needs to be

done," he said and revealed that FRP wants to improve its membership paper, FREMSKRIDT--and publish it for distribution at news stands.

"It will be a fresh newspaper with articles that stimulate debate--a kind of Progressive Party 'Kapital.'"

In the near future the party will look for the 14 Storting representatives it has set as its goal for 1985. "Those who are interested should let us know now. It will be an open fight during the nomination process, which must be completed next year. We abide by Darwin's law--survival of the fittest. But they should not simply be capable people. We also need charisma."

Hagen Challenges Labor, Center

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] Carl I. Hagen wants to have a political settling of accounts with the Labor and Center parties. "I challenge Gro Harlem Brundtland to a debate on unemployment, taxes, fees and the union movement's abuse of the dues paid by its members. I want to meet Johan J. Jakobsen in a debate on district policy and farm policy. The question is whether the two will dare to pick up the gauntlet they themselves threw down so boldly in the last lap of the election." Hagen said this after a meeting of the Progressive Party's national committee yesterday.

Hagen made no attempt to hide his irritation at what he called the pressure on the Conservatives to have things out with FRP. "Parties pushing for this should try it themselves, if they dare. Therefore I hope we can set up some good debate meetings with the leaders of the Labor and Center parties on their favorite themes in the course of the fall."

Carl I. Hagen said his party would take the initiative for a nonpartisan security policy action on 15-22 October of this year. "Yes to Defense, Peace and Security," will be the motto of the action, which will be a response to the activity of the No to Nuclear Arms group. They will get in touch with private organizations and the parties that stand firmly behind NATO's dual decision.

Naturally enough, the Progressive Party's national committee meeting was dominated by the party's good election results. "We have started the campaign leading up to the 1985 Storting election," said Carl I. Hagen, who continued: ""We achieved our goal, which was a support level of 6 percent. Our goal for 1985 is 14 seats in Storting. Yesterday we decided which counties we should try to get these seats from. I will not say anything about which counties are involved at this time."

The Progressive Party especially wants to have its elected representatives become town council chairmen, members of building councils, social agencies, school boards and administrative bodies.

Hagen said it was natural for his party to seek cooperation with nonsocialist parties. "But if these parties show us a cold shoulder, I would not rule out a tactical cooperation with the Labor Party and SV in some places.

"But I am counting on our getting 'fair' treatment. It is clear that our party is prepared to contribute to so-called package solutions. It is not possible for a party with serious intentions to come into negotiations with ironclad demands."

Carl I. Hagen said that the party had completed its training program for its elected representatives and that the training would start soon.

The party chairman said that he had noted with great interest Prime Minister Willoch's statement that his task as prime minister is to promote a policy that can attract majority support in Storting. "I assume that Willoch will do the same after the 1985 Storting election. Then he must either take our views into account or he must continue his political course in the direction of the Labor Party. For he will not get a majority with the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. Then we would have decisive influence on national policy as well--as we now have on local politics in many places," Carl I. Hagen said.

Progressives Buy Into Conservative Paper

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Sep 83 p 3

[Text] Bergen, 15 Sep--Some members of the Progressive Party in Bergen have bought up shares in MORGENAVISEN. They hope in this way to get on the board in order to take part in the management of the Conservative organ, according to BERGENS ARBEIDERBLAD. Knut Hanselmann, the Progressive Party's top candidate in Bergen, confirmed this.

This is not the first time the Progressive Party has bought stocks in Conservative daily papers in the hope of being represented on the paper's board of directors. A similar attempt was made with respect to MORGENBLADET but this did not lead to board representation for the party's stock buyers.

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COMMENTS ON ECONOMICS, LOGISTICS OF AIRCRAFT PURCHASE

Athens ANDI in Greek 2 Sep 83 pp 14-15

[Text] The story of the aircraft purchase is somewhat too well known from what the press has written. We will confine ourselves here to pointing out some facts.

The most recent information reports that Mr. Arsenis created a problem for the premier when, somewhat curtly, he told him that the country cannot get involved with the billions needed for the purchase of the fighter aircraft. Perhaps Mr. Arsenis' observation will not cancel their purchase. There are powerful reasons for defense and politics which place the financial consideration on a secondary level. However, one must seriously ask: Where is this money going to be found? Because an intensification of the austerity and/or a loan contracted by the country to obtain the money would have us kneeling before our creditors who might have political suggestions to make besides the economic ones.

In any event, it is known that the KYSEA [Government Council for National Defense] is delaying its meeting to reach a decision on the subject. And, as has been announced, it will be necessary to hold more than one meeting in order to reach a final decision. It is not known when the meeting will take place.

A second point. Many point out that Turkey is modestly keeping silent as to whether it will also purchase aircraft. It is thought that they are waiting for us to take the first step so that they can afterwards buy the same types. If there is some foundation for this, then it should be taken into consideration, based on the favorable treatment of Turkey by the entire West on both the subject of the purchase and that of the eventual type of aircraft to be purchased--whether there are aircraft which Turkey cannot purchase because it will have to pay cash for them, while they might serve our defense needs.

Expert Air Force officers and other responsible officials are aware that there will be an interval of from 1 to 2 years between the signing of the agreement and the arrival of the first group of aircraft. If, for instance, the agreement were to be signed at the end of the year, then we will receive some of the 100 aircraft in 1985. And when the order is completed, their technology may well be obsolete. This was one of the reasons why the Air Force insisted that the order should have been placed by the end of 1982, at the latest...

Third point. The offset contributions. A complex subject. Canada, which in

1981, ordered 138 American aircraft for which it paid 2.5 billion dollars, studied for 3 years the offset contributions in order to choose the ones it wanted. And Australia took 4 whole years to reach a decision on the same subject.

Just to mention one facet, from the offset contributions as a whole, Canada secured investments in tourism and the obligation, on the part of the Americans, to send a certain number of tourists to Canada through 1994. The total of American investments in tourism reached 2.9 billion dollars. It is to be noted that the Americans accepted investing more money than what they took in because the Canadians will pay off the aircraft at the time of the last delivery in 1985, while the American investments will be spread over a longer time period.

The Greek experience? For the purchase of the "Mirages," which our Air Force already has, the agreement was signed first and the subject of the offset contributions was left for later. Result: Dasseult offered us, from a position of strength by then and without the possibility of choice on our part, a type of technology which, in order to be exploited, required EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry], to make several investments. The ND lost one more battle because it does not appear to have fought it.

With PASOK things do not seem to go any better. The same man who abolished the regulations for promotions seems to be responsible...

A commission was formed to study, in just a few months, which offset contributions are advantageous to Greece because only thus can the transfer of technology to Greece be made, under favorable terms for the country.

The commission worked and at a certain point came to the conclusion that it had to admit, in all honesty, that its members could not reach a decision because they did not have the necessary qualifications. It requested that foreign specialists be hired. The immediate reaction of the chairman of the Administrative Council was to propose the hiring of three or four American cost analysis experts so that they could choose which offset contributions are advantageous to Greece. It was then pointed out that it was not feasible to hire Americans only in view of the fact that two of the interested companies are American and that at least some Europeans should be hired. The answer was that there were none available at the moment... It is all of this that smells fishy... What is their proposal any way? Has it been implemented?

The government points out, and with good reason, that, in the matter of the aircraft, tremendous amounts of money and interests are at stake. Everybody should be careful...

Last but not least, as they say, is the subject of what type of aircraft will be purchased.

There are two criteria. The politico-economic one which the premier has emphasized repeatedly and the purely military one.

It is natural for the Air Force officers to give priority to the "technical"

aspect of the subject. They say, the aircraft are being purchased for defense, they must, therefore, be able to do the job. But the government is not wrong in taking into consideration the politico-economic aspect as well. The pressures, on the other hand, are considerable.

Technically, the American F18 comes closer to the dual function of the aircraft for air-to-air combat and as an attack bomber. Each costs about 30 million dollars. The F16 has reduced capabilities as a bomber. It costs about 15-16 million dollars. The "Mirage 2000" also has reduced capabilities as a bomber and costs around 18 million dollars. Finally, the "Tornado" is exclusively a bomber with a cost of about 20 million dollars.

We emphasize that the prices are merely suggestive because it must be made clear that if they were to include spare parts and the expense of training the pilots as well as a multitude of other considerations, this would necessitate a special article to analyze them. It must also be taken into consideration that the cost is balanced out by the offset contributions.

We add that certain outstanding experienced Air Force officers maintain that it would be in the country's interest, if it does not purchase the F18 which satisfactorily fulfills the dual function, that it then must combine an aircraft capable of air-to-air combat with a good bomber.

They say that only if the adversary is afraid of having its territory bombed, or territory it occupies, can it be deterred from attempting aggressive actions.

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